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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation endeavours to establish whether the Tax Administration Act sufficiently protects the 
taxpayers’ constitutional rights to privacy and right to be informed.  
Specifically it will be investigating these rights versus the powers provided to SARS under the 
different fiscal statutes to access information and to exchange information internationally. 
The research focussed on the rights conferred on taxpayers in terms of the Constitution versus the 
powers awarded to SARS in terms of the Tax Administration Act and the Income Tax Act. The 
research included other relevant fiscal statutes, books, case law, websites, articles and comments of 
experts. 
It has been said that the Commissioner of SARS has “draconian powers” that infringe on the rights of 
taxpayers. My research concludes that most of these rights are reasonable and justifiable limited in 
the interest of a democratic society in order to fund the administrative and financial burden on the 
state. 
The current society with advanced information technology has resulted in information being easily 
accessible and transferred and accordingly our privacy is being more invaded than before.  
This is also the case in dealings with the tax authorities but is considered a justifiable infringement in 
order to collect taxes to finance an open and democratic society.  
Tax authorities around the world are entering into tax information exchange agreements that make 
the sharing of taxpayer information permissible by law.  
The search and seizure powers without a warrant are substantially unconstitutional. It should be noted 
that these powers have been challenged in court and the Commissioner will not easily authorise such 
actions without being convinced that his actions are above the law. Taxpayers’ will therefore not be 
subject to these powers on a regular basis.    
Taxpayers’ are not always informed of their right to administrative justice that ensures lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair administrative actions by the Commissioner.  
The newly appointed tax ombudsman will be a more cost effective remedy for challenging the powers 
of SARS and it is likely that the future will bring about more precedents that will prevent the abuse of 
powers. The Tax Ombudsman will have a duty to educate taxpayers’ about their rights and also to 
educate the SARS officials on reasonable and procedurally fair conduct. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Background 
In any democratic society the taxpayers will have certain basic rights. It was found that taxpayers 
enjoyed the following basic rights in all OECD countries:1 
-The right to be informed, assisted and heard 
-The right of appeal 
-The right to pay no more than the correct amount of tax 
-The right to certainty 
-The right to privacy 
-The right to confidentiality and secrecy 
 
SARS officially released the SARS Service Charter and Service Standards to the public on 19 
October 2005 after recommendation by the Katz Commission (Katz Commission, 1995). The original 
version has been withdrawn from the website, and has been replaced by a new version called SARS 
Service Charter and Standards. This charter did not grant the taxpayer any legal enforceable rights 
but does explain the taxpayers’ rights in layman terms. 
 
Most revenue authorities recognise taxpayers’ rights in either a legislative or administrative form. Of 
these, 45 countries have codified them (partly or full) in tax law or other statutes, while 43 revenue 
authorities operate with a set of rights and obligations that are detailed in administrative documents, 
sometimes referred to as ‘taxpayer’ or ‘service’ charters. This indicates a significant increase from 
2003 when the OECD found that only about 66% of revenue authorities had some form of formal 
statement of taxpayer’s rights.2 
 
South Africa promulgated the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (TAA) that came into effect on 1 
October 2012. “The Act is intended to simplify and provide greater coherence in South African tax 
administration law. It eliminates duplication, removes redundant requirements and aligns disparate 
requirements that had previously existed in a number of different tax Acts.” 
 
“The Act creates a single, modern framework for the common administrative provisions of the tax 
Acts. It also aligns the South African Revenue Service (SARS) with international best practice and 
modern tax administration practices. Crucially, the Act seeks to achieve a balance of rights and 
                                                          
1
 OECD, 1990. Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations: A survey of the Legal Situation in OECD Countries 
2
 OECD, 2013. Tax Administration 2013: Comparative Information on OECD and Other Advanced and Emerging 
Economies 
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obligations between the South African taxpayer and SARS itself.” (Press release issued by SARS on 
1 October, 2012) 
 
“This new legislation aspires to do more than merely collate and consolidate the administrative 
provisions of the various tax acts into a single statutory instrument, for it also attempts to make 
substantive changes to various administrative processes.” (Klue, et al., 2012) 
 
The Constitution of South Africa is the supreme law3 of the country and guarantees all citizens rights.  
The rights of taxpayers’ ultimately flow from the Constitution.  South Africa promulgated the Tax 
Administration Act, No 28 of 2011 with the intention to recognise and respect taxpayers’ constitutional 
rights in matters regarding tax administration, but without attempting to give detailed expression to 
those rights.   
 
1.2 What is the administration of a Tax Act? 
“The ‘administration’ of a tax Act means to: 
(a) obtain full information in relation to— 
(i) anything that may affect the liability of a person for tax in respect of a previous, current or 
future tax period; 
(ii) a taxable event; or 
(iii) the obligation of a person (whether personally or on behalf of another person) to comply 
with a tax Act; 
(b) ascertain whether a person has filed or submitted correct returns, information or documents in 
compliance with the provisions of a tax Act; 
(c) establish the identity of a person for purposes of determining liability for tax; 
(d) determine the liability of a person for tax; 
(e) collect tax and refund tax overpaid; 
(f) investigate whether an offence has been committed in terms of a tax Act, and, 
if so— 
(i) to lay criminal charges; and 
(ii) to provide the assistance that is reasonably required for the investigation 
and prosecution of tax offences or related common law offences; 
(g) enforce SARS’ powers and duties under a tax Act to ensure that an obligation 
imposed by or under a tax Act is complied with; 
(h) perform any other administrative function necessary to carry out the 
                                                          
3
 Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution: “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.” 
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provisions of a tax Act; and 
(i) give effect to the obligation of the Republic to provide assistance under an 
international tax agreement.”4 
1.3 Research question 
This dissertation endeavours to establish whether the Tax Administration Act sufficiently protects the 
taxpayers’ rights to privacy and right to be informed. Specifically it will be investigating these rights 
versus the powers of SARS to access information and to exchange information internationally. 
1.4 Research method 
The research method used is that of a doctrinal type of legal research. The different statutes, 
commentary and judicial decisions were identified, analysed, organised and amalgamated. The South 
African rules were analysed and compared with international rules, mainly those published by the 
OECD. The information was critically assessed to derive the conclusion.  
1.5 Limitations to the scope of the study 
The TAA consolidates the common administrative provisions of the Transfer Duty Act, 1949 (Act No. 
40 of 1949), Estate Duty Act, 1955 (Act No. 45 of 1955), Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962), 
Value-Added Tax Act, 1991 (Act No. 89 of 1991), Skills Development Levies Act, 1999 (Act No. 9 of 
1999), the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act, 2002 (Act No 4 of 2002), Diamond Export 
Levy (Administration) Act, 2007 (Act No. 14 of 2007), Securities Transfer Tax Administration Act, 
2007 (Act No. 26 of 2007) and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty (Administration) Act, 
2008 (Act No. 29 of 2008). 
Comparisons with administrative provisions were limited to that of the Income Tax Act, 1962 due to 
the fact that the drafting of TAA was seen as a preliminary step of rewriting the Income Tax Act of 
which about 25% of its text consisted of administrative provisions.5 
This dissertation does not take into account any development in law that occurred after 1 December 
2013. 
1.6 Structure of dissertation 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the TAA has awarded the SARS with more draconian powers to 
enforce tax legislation as opposed to the limited rights to protect the taxpayer. This dissertation seeks 
to investigate these powers of the tax authority and the remedies available to protect the taxpayers’ 
rights in terms of civil law, the Constitution and common law. 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation comprise the following. 
Chapter Two: The right to privacy, the Constitution and Tax Law 
                                                          
4
 See s3 of the Tax Administration Act, No 28 of 2011 
5
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Bill, 2011 at 2.1 
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Chapter Two analyses the right to privacy in terms of the Constitution and when the limitation of this 
right is justifiable. This Chapter also investigates the powers awarded to SARS in terms of domestic 
legislation that could infringe upon this right. 
Chapter Three: Is the right to privacy protected with the exchange of information? 
This chapter investigates the confidentiality standards with regards to international models for the 
exchange of information. 
Chapter Four: The taxpayer’s right to be informed about and appeal against the exchange of 
information 
This chapter seeks to establish if the taxpayer has a right to be informed when his personal tax 
information is being exchanged and whether there are any remedies available to prevent this 
exchange.  
The last chapter, Chapter Five, concludes on the taxpayers’ right to privacy and the right to be 
informed. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, THE CONSTITUTION AND TAX 
LAW 
2.1 The Constitution 
2.1.1 The Constitutional Right to Privacy 
SARS has the obligation to ensure that all persons are compliant with tax legislation6 and this can 
only be verified by comparing the taxpayer’s declaration with supporting documentation. Naturally 
taxpayers’ are concerned about the infringement of their right to privacy when requested for personal 
and confidential information.  
The Constitution provides in section 14 that: 
“14. Privacy.—Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have— 
(a) their person or home searched;  
(b)  their property searched;  
(c)   their possessions seized; or  
(d)  the privacy of their communications infringed.” 
 
The Constitutional Court discussed the meaning of privacy in Bernstein and Others v Bester N.O. and 
Others:7 
”Privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by seclusion from the public and 
publicity. This implies an absence of acquaintance with the individual or his personal affairs 
in this state.”[ …] The unlawfulness of a (factual) infringement of privacy is adjudged in the 
light of contemporary boni mores and the general sense of justice of the community as 
perceived by the Court.” 
The courts adopted a two-part test8 to determine whether a persons’ right to privacy has been 
infringed in particular circumstances. The first part is to establish whether a subjective expectation of 
the bearer of the right that something is a personal matter exists and the second part is whether this is 
considered a reasonable and justifiable expectation by society in general.    
                                                          
6
 See s4(1) of the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 
7
 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) at 484 and 485. 
8
 Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NO. 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) 
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The right to privacy of an individual is more intense the closer it is to his intimate personal sphere and 
less intense the further it is from this personal sphere.9  
Everyone has the right to privacy10 and it is not only enjoyed by natural persons but also by juristic 
persons, although to a lesser extent. 
Langa DP, followed the judgment in Bernstein11 when handing down judgment in the Hyundai Motors 
Case: 
“Juristic persons are not the bearers of human dignity. Their privacy rights, therefore, can 
never be as intense as those of human beings. However, this does not mean that juristic 
persons are not protected by the right to privacy. Exclusion of juristic persons would lead to 
the possibility of grave violations of privacy in our society, with serious implications for the 
conduct of affairs. The state might, for instance, have free licence to search and seize 
material from any non-profit organisation or corporate entity at will. This would obviously 
lead to grave disruptions and would undermine the very fabric of our democratic state. 
Juristic persons therefore do enjoy the right to privacy, although not to the same extent as 
natural persons. The level of justification for any particular limitation of the right will have to 
be judged in the light of the circumstances of each case. Relevant circumstances would 
include whether the subject of the limitation is a natural person or a juristic person as well as 
the nature and effect of the invasion of privacy”.12 
2.1.2 The Limitation of Constitutional Rights 
Constitutional rights are not absolute and an infringement may be justifiable where it is in the interest 
of a democratic society.  
Section 7(3) of the Constitution provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the 
limitations contained or referred to in section 36 or elsewhere in the Bill. 
The constitutional right of privacy is not absolute and an infringement of the right may be justifiable in 
terms of section 36 of the Constitution13 which is the general limitation provision. The onus of proving 
that a limitation on a constitutional right is justified under the general limitation clause rests upon the 
person invoking the limitation. This onus is not easily discharged and the person will have to explain 
                                                          
9
 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC) 
at para 18. 
10
 NM v Smith 2007 7 BCLR 751 (CC), 2007 5 SA 250 (CC) par [132] 
11
 Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NNO. 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) 
12
 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai 
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO and Others [2000] ZACC 12; 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) 
13
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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the purpose of the limitation and how the limitation promotes the achievement of that purpose. The 
limitation must serve an important objective in the interest of a free and democratic society.14  
Limitation of rights as contained in section 36 of the Constitution provides: 
“(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including-  
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law 
may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.” 
The Constitutional Court follows a two-stage approach to establish whether a limitation of a 
constitutional guaranteed right is reasonable and justifiable. The Constitutional Court has described 
the two-staged approach as follows: 
“The question of whether a right in the Bill of Rights has been violated generally involves a two-
pronged enquiry. The first enquiry is whether the ... provision limits a right in the Bill of Rights. If 
the provision limits a right in the Bill of Rights, this right must be clearly identified. The second 
enquiry is whether the limitation is reasonable and justifiable under section 36(1) of the 
Constitution. Courts considering the constitutionality of a statutory provision should therefore 
adhere to this approach to constitutional adjudication”.15 
Section 36 does not define the purpose for which rights may be limited. The purposes for which rights 
are limited by tax legislation are normally in the public interest such as the collection of taxes in order 
to fund the administrative and financial burden on the state.16 This purpose is important enough to 
justify, within reason, the right to privacy in our open and democratic society. 
                                                          
14
 Park-Ross and Another v The Director, Office for serious Economic Offences, 1995 (2) BCLR 198 (C) at 215A; 
R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4
th
) 200 SCC; Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625 (E) at 640H-641C; 
Khala v Minister of Safety and Security 1994 (4) SA 218 (W) at 228D-I; S v Majavu 1994 (4) SA 268 (CK) at 315I-
J; Phato v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape, 1995 (1) SA799 (E) at 833D; Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue, Port 
Elizabeth 1995 (2) SA433 (SE) at 453D. 
15
 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (4) SA 
222 (CC) par [41] 
16
 Rautenbach, IM. Bill of Rights Compendium, 1A49.(LexisNexis, South Africa, last updated October 2011). 
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There must be a balance between the importance of the purpose of the limitation and the nature and 
extent of the limitation. This was confirmed by the court in Law Society of South Africa v Minister of 
Transport where it was stated: 
 “It is significant that one of the relevant factors listed in section 36 is the “relation between the 
limitation and its purpose”. This is so because the requirement of rationality is indeed a logical 
part of the proportionality test. It is self-evident that a measure which is irrational could hardly 
pass muster as reasonable and justifiable for the purposes of restricting a fundamental 
right”.17  
The Tax Administration Act will infringe upon some fundamental Constitutional rights of taxpayers and 
in terms of section 36, it should be established whether or not the infringement by these provisions 
could be considered reasonable and justifiable.  
2.2 Information gathering 
2.2.1 New Information gathering Powers and Procedure 
SARS’ information gathering powers are significantly enhanced by the TAA and similarly the 
taxpayers’ rights are enhanced and made more explicit to counterbalance SARS’ new information 
gathering powers. This was necessary to address the problem that SARS experienced when 
requesting information and then having protracted disputes as to whether they are entitled to this 
information.  It is an established international principle that a revenue authority should not have to 
divert its focus from ensuring compliance with the tax acts with debates as to the entitlement of the 
revenue authority to the information.18 
Sections 74A, B, C and D of the Income Tax Act were replaced by sections 40 to 66 of the TAA.  
According to the SARS Short Guide to the Tax Administration Act (at p19) the TAA allows SARS six 
different methods to collect relevant information: 
- Inspection of a business premises; 
- Request for information; 
- Production of relevant material in person during an interview at a SARS office; 
- A filed audit or criminal investigation at the premises of a person; 
- Formal enquiry before a presiding officer; 
- Search and seizure. 
The failure to furnish requested relevant information or answer questions is an offence and subject to 
civil proceedings19 and criminal proceedings20 unless a taxpayer has just cause for such failure. 
                                                          
17
 2011 2 BCLR 150 (CC) par [37] 
18
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Bill, 2011 at 2.2.5 
19
 See s 210 of the TAA 
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2.3 What is just cause for failing to provide information? 
A person with just cause may refuse to provide information or answer questions.21 This is a common 
law right of taxpayers’ that protect them against the abuse of the information gathering powers by 
SARS. The certain circumstances with ‘just cause’ that warrant the taxpayer to refuse to provide 
information is discussed here below.  
Just cause has been described as: 
“On the face of it ‘just excuse’ is a wider concept in its ordinary meaning than, for instance, an 
expression like ‘lawful excuse’, which would have been more appropriate to connote an excuse 
sanctioned by existing rules of law.”22 
2.3.1 “Just cause” and legal professional privilege 
A taxpayer may refuse to comply with a request for information from SARS on the ground that the 
documentation is subject to legal professional privilege and the disclosure thereof could infringe on 
his rights. 
Privilege is a word used by many professions. In South Africa the common law position is currently 
that other than marriage, the only relationship which gives rise to privilege information is the attorney 
client relationship. South African court judgments have held that privilege does not extend to other 
professional relationships23 such as journalists,24 insurers,25 ministers of religion26 or doctors. 
Legal professional privilege is a common law principle for the benefit of individuals and companies 
seeking and obtaining legal advice and was developed by the judges in England going back to the 
16th century. This privilege has been accepted by South African courts in a tax context. See for 
example Heiman, Maasdorp and Barker v Secretary for Inland Revenue (1968) (30 SATC 145) and 
Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue, Port Elizabeth 1995 (2) SA 433 (SE). 
This privilege has also been accepted as a fundamental right by the Constitutional Court in Thint (Pty) 
Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions; Zuma v. National Director of Public Prosecutions 
[2008] ZACC 14; 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) where it was held that: 
 “[184] The right to legal professional privilege is a general rule of our common law which 
states that communications between a legal advisor and his or her client are protected from 
disclosure, provided that certain requirements are met. The rationale of this right has changed 
over time. It is now generally accepted that these communications should be protected in 
order to facilitate the proper functioning of an adversarial system of justice, because it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
20
 See s234(h), (i) and (j) of the TAA 
21
 See s49(2) of the TAA 
22
 Attorney-General, Transvaal v Kader [1991] 2 All SA 543 (A) at page 547 
23
 Mandela v Minister of Prisons 1983(1) SA938(A) 
24
 S v Pogrund 1961 (3) SA 868(T); S V Cornelissen 1994(2)SACR 41 (W) 
25
 Howe v Mabuya 1961 (2) SA635(D) 
26
 Smit v Van Niekerk NO en ‘n Ander 1976(4) SA293(A) 
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encourages full and frank disclosure between advisors and clients. This, in turn, promotes 
fairness in litigation. In the context of criminal proceedings, moreover, the right to have 
privileged communications with a lawyer protected is necessary to uphold the right to a fair 
trial in terms of s. 35 of the Constitution, and for that reason it is to be taken very seriously 
indeed.  
[185] Accordingly, privileged materials may not be admitted as evidence without consent. Nor 
may they be seized under a search warrant. They need not be disclosed during the discovery 
process. The person in whom the right vests may not be obliged to testify about the content of 
the privileged material. It should, however, be emphasised that the common-law right to legal 
professional privilege must be claimed by the right-holder or by the right-holder’s legal 
representative. The right is not absolute; it may, depending upon the facts of a specific case, 
be outweighed by countervailing considerations.”27 
 
The essential requirements for legal professional privilege to exist: 
-The communications that are sought to be protected must have been made to a legal advisor 
acting in a professional capacity. 
The simple fact that a person is an advocate or attorney does not give rise to the conclusion that 
information shared with him will be privileged. There are several indicators of a person acting in a 
professional capacity and not for example on a friendly basis. The payment of a fee is the most 
important but not necessary conclusive indicator. 
-The information must have been supplied in confidence. 
The communications between a legal professional and his client must originate in a confidence that it 
will not be disclosed. There can be no legal privilege where the nature of the communications 
indicates that the client is prepared to disclose the information to other parties. 
-The information must have been supplied for the purpose of pending litigation or for the 
purpose of obtaining professional advice. 
The mere fact that a person handed confidential documentation in a file to a legal professional does 
not make it subject to legal professional privilege when the lawyer was not consulted for legal advice. 
-The advice must not facilitate the commission of a crime or fraud 
Privilege will not apply if a client sought advice for purpose of committing a crime or fraud, even if the 
attorney was not aware of his clients’ intentions. 
 
-The client must claim the privilege.  
The client has to claim the privilege or waive this privilege expressly or by implication. A court will not 
invoke the privilege of its own accord. 
                                                          
27
 At  page 105. 
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Extension of legal professional privilege to accountants 
The global opinion of accountants is that most tax consulting is done by accountants and that their 
communications with their clients on tax matters should be just as much protected from disclosure as 
if the communications were with a legal professional.28 
National Treasury received requests that the legal professional privilege should be extended to the 
tax practitioner profession as most tax advice is given by tax practitioners who are not admitted 
attorneys or advocates. This request was also submitted in order to “level the playing field” as the 
legal tax consultants have an unfair advantage.29 
Treasury commented that the legal professional privilege is a common law right that originated in the 
United Kingdom in the sixteenth century and in countries where this privilege is extended to other 
professionals it has to be done by statute. The decision was not to extend the privilege in the TAA to 
other professions because “SARS’s view is that just as is the case in Germany, the USA and (if a 
limited privilege is extended in that country) Australia, a prerequisite for considering the extension of 
privilege in tax matters to non-lawyers is that the tax practitioners are regulated, not by self-
constituted professional bodies, but by law”.30 
The National Treasury referred to the UK case of Prudential Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v 
Special Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors [2010] EWCA Civ 1094 where the legal professional 
privilege was denied by the court when communications take place between an accountant and client 
seeking and giving advice on tax law. At that time the ruling was still on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal. The judgment handed down, in a split decision, by this court on 23 January 2013 was that 
the appeal should not be allowed because it is a policy issue and best left to Parliament to decide.   
It should be noted that the court were of the opinion that communications with an accountant should 
be just as much protected from disclosure as that with a legal professional, but that the court did not 
have the authority to rule and that it would have been inappropriate to do so.  
It is submitted that it is improbable that our courts will depart from the established international 
common law principles. It is submitted that this privilege will not be enacted in the TAA until such time 
as tax practitioners are regulated by law. 
2.3.2 “Just cause” and bank client confidentiality 
A South African bank owes a duty of confidentiality to its clients that would generally prevent the 
disclosure of client information to third parties. This common law duty of confidentiality is overridden 
by SARS information gathering powers enacted by constitutionally valid legislation. 
 
                                                          
28
 Standing Committee on Finance. 2011. Report –Back Hearings on the Tax Administration Bill, 11 of 2010. 
Pretoria: National Treasury. At page 6. 
29
 Ibid p 5. 
30
 Ibid p 6. 
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This is in line with the common law principle that the duty of banker-client confidentiality can be 
overridden in situations where: 
 -the disclosure is compelled by law 
 -the client agrees to the disclosure of information 
 -the disclosure is for the bank’s protection, or 
 -the circumstances gives rise to a public duty of disclosure 
 
In a recent judgment by the Federal High Court of Australia,31 the court had to decide whether a 
request from the Australian Tax Office (ATO) for information on banking detail was in breach of 
certain non-statutory obligations of confidentiality between a bank and its clients. This information was 
requested in terms of section 264 of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) which awards 
the Commissioner the same information gathering powers as section 46 of the South African Tax 
Administration Act. 
 
It was held that section 264 was inserted in the ITAA to enable the Commissioner in performing his 
functions and responsibilities and that it confers upon the Commissioner very broad investigatory 
powers in order to perform those functions. 
 
The bank contended that the information is subject to bank/client privilege. A banker has a contractual 
obligation which includes an implied term that the banker will not divulge any information to a third 
party. The court held that an obligation by law overrides any non-statutory contractual obligation of 
confidentiality. 
 
The court quoted from Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd32 where it was held that: 
"[...]the existence of the contractual duty provides no just cause or excuse for refusing or 
neglecting to produce the documents. It is likely that documents which relate to the income 
or assessment of a taxpayer will often be entrusted by him to another, for example, to a 
Bank, a solicitor or an accountant. The Parliament cannot have intended that a person 
whose taxation affairs were under consideration could protect his documents from 
disclosure simply by binding the person to whom they were entrusted to refrain from 
producing them." 
Gibbs ACJ concluded at 522 that:  
"The terms of a contract made between the taxpayer and the custodian of his documents 
would appear quite irrelevant for the purposes of s 264(1), and there is nothing in the 
provisions of the sub-section that would support the view that the existence of a contractual 
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 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Konza & Anor [2012] FCA 196 
32
 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 76 ATC at 521 
13 
 
duty, or an arrangement short of a contract, to refrain from producing the documents should 
be regarded either as having the effect that the documents were not in the custody or under 
the control of the person who in fact had them in his custody or under his control, or as 
providing just cause or excuse for failing to produce them." 
The court dismissed the applicant’s application and held that the existence of the contractual duty 
provides no just cause or excuse for refusing to produce the information. 
 
The same principles apply in South Africa where it has been held that the contractual duty to preserve 
secrecy can be overridden for considerations of public interest.33 A bank will therefore not have “just 
cause” to refuse to adhere to a request for information by SARS.  
2.3.3 “Just cause” and the constitutional right against self-incrimination 
Section 50 of the TAA authorises SARS to conduct an enquiry into the tax affairs of a person. This 
enquiry extends the information gathering powers of SARS by questioning a taxpayer regarding his 
tax affairs while he is under oath. 
The Constitution awards all persons a right to a fair trial which includes the privilege against self-
incrimination by refusing to answer questions. 
The privilege against self-incrimination is inconsistent with the information gathering powers awarded 
to the Commissioner in terms of section 50 of the TAA. If a taxpayer entitled to plead the privilege to 
excuse an answer when interviewed, then Commissioner’s powers would be nullified. 
The Constitutional Court held as follows in the matter of Harold Bernstein and Others v  
L. Von Wielligh Bester NO and Others considering an application where there was a possible violation 
of rights to privacy when declining to answer: 
 “The application of the Constitution to the issue of ‘sufficient cause’ in the present context 
would operate as follows. The first part of the enquiry is whether answering the particular 
question would infringe the applicant’s right to privacy. If it would, this would constitute 
‘sufficient cause’ for declining to answer the question unless the section 418(5)(b)(iii)(aa) 
compulsion to answer the question would, in all the circumstances, constitute a limitation on 
the right to privacy which is justified under section 33(1) of the Constitution.” 
It is submitted that a taxpayer will not be able to rely on the right to avoid self-incrimination by refusing 
to answer questions as section 50 of the TAA is a reasonable limitation of his rights, particularly in the 
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 First Rand Bank v Chaucer Publications (Pty) Ltd, 2008(2) SA 592 (CPD) 
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light that incriminating evidence obtained during an enquiry is not admissible in criminal proceedings, 
unless a competent court directs otherwise.34 
A taxpayer may also not refuse to file a tax return on the grounds that it might contain evidence of a 
tax offence that might incriminate him. Any admission made by a taxpayer in a return is inadmissible 
in criminal proceedings unless a competent court direct otherwise.35 
2.4 PAJA and Administrative Action 
The taxpayer is protected from abuse by the Commissioner when exercising the powers awarded to 
him in terms of the TAA.   
In terms of section 33 of the Constitution, administrative action will be reasonable, lawful and 
procedurally fair. It also provides that a person can request reasons for administrative action that 
could materially and negatively affect their rights. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (PAJA) was enacted to give effect to this right. The Constitutional Court has held that all statutes 
that authorise administrative action must be read together with PAJA.36 PAJA is enacted in terms of 
the Constitution and has an overriding application.37  
Section 3(2)(b) of PAJA lists the five core elements of procedural fairness: 
“In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator, 
subject to subsection (4), must give a person referred to in subsection (1)– 
(i) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action; 
 (ii) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
 (iii) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
(iv) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable; and 
(v)  adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5.” 
 
PAJA defines an administrative action38 as a decision or a failure to take a decision in terms of an 
empowering provision by an organ of the State which adversely affects his rights. The decisions must 
impose a burden or negative effect such as a decision to require someone to do something or a 
decision that may limit someone’s rights. 
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 Zondi v MEC for Traditional & Local Govt Affairs 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC) at par 101 
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 SARS. 2012. Short Guide to the Tax Administration Act, 2011 at page 9. 
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 The term ‘administrative action’ is defined in section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, No. 3 
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A decision taken by SARS, to exercise its powers under the provisions of the TAA, which could 
adversely affect any Constitutional right of a taxpayer, will constitute an administrative action. It is not 
possible to compile a list of administrative actions as each case will have to be decided on its own 
merits. An example of an administrative action will be a request for information, documentation or 
things due to the fact that it could materially and adversely affect the rights of a taxpayer. Most 
information gathering decisions taken by SARS may amount to administrative action as the taxpayer 
is requested to do something (provide information) that could affect his rights (limitation on his right to 
privacy).  
PAJA provides that taxpayers may request written reasons for administrative action taken by organs 
of the state.39 A taxpayer may therefore request SARS to give adequate reasons in writing for any 
administrative decision taken. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Environmental Affairs & 
Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd43 laid down the standard for what constitutes ‘adequate 
reasons’: 
“[T]he decision-maker [must] explain his decision in a way which will enable a person 
aggrieved to say, in effect: ‘Even though I may not agree with it, I now understand why 
the decision went against me. I am now in a position to decide whether that decision has 
involved an unwarranted finding of fact, or an error of law, which is worth challenging.’ 
This requires that the decision-maker should set out his understanding of the relevant 
law, any findings of fact on which his conclusions depend (especially if those facts have 
been in dispute), and the reasoning processes which led him to those conclusions”. 
A decision to audit a taxpayer could also constitute an administrative action. This view is shared by 
others: 
 The view as submitted by Bentley:44 
“Taxpayers should be given prior notification of an audit and the opportunity to request 
postponement of the audit if they have good reasons. As in any administrative decision, the 
tax authority should explain to taxpayers why they are chosen for an audit, what taxes and 
what years the audit will cover, how the audit will proceed, and give the taxpayer the 
opportunity to contact and use legal or other representative in dealing with the tax authority.” 
The view submitted by Croome:45 
                                                          
39
 Section 5(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, No. 3 of 2000 reads as follows:  
‘Any person whose rights have been materially and adversely affected by administrative action and who has 
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 2003 (6) SA 407 (SCA) at para 40. 
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“To ensure compliance with the fiscal statutes the Commissioner calls for information from 
taxpayers and conducts audits of their affairs. It is contended that the decision to call for 
information from a taxpayer constitutes ‘administrative action’ that is subject to PAJA.”  
The view as submitted by Erasmus:46 
”[I]t is appropriate for me to justify why I say a decision to audit a taxpayer is administrative 
action. My views are based on my draft PhD thesis which analyses the inter-relationship in 
particular between ss 2, 33, 41(1), 172(1), 195(1) and 237 of the Constitution 108 of 1996; s 
4(2) of the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 (SARS Act); the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA); and a decision by the Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Service to exercise his powers under ss 40, 46, 47 and 48 of the 
Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 by requiring taxpayers to submit, produce or make 
available relevant material. My thesis concludes that such a decision by the Commissioner 
(or SARS) constitutes administrative action as defined in s 1 of PAJA.” 
The taxpayer is protected from administrative actions by SARS that are not lawful, reasonable and 
fair. The provisions of PAJA have a powerful impact on how the Commissioner exercises his duties 
under the fiscal statutes. An aggrieved taxpayer may challenge SARS and request reasons for 
decisions taken. He may institute proceedings in court for the review of decisions taken that are not 
reasonable, lawful and procedurally fair.  
 
2.5 General rules for inspection, verification, audit and criminal 
investigation 
2.5.1 Inspection at premises 
2.5.1.1 The legislation previously and now 
The repealed provisions of the Income Tax Act 
74B. Obtaining of information, documents or 
things at certain premises 
The Tax Administration Act 
45. Inspection 
 
 
2.5.1.2  Inspections 
Section 45 of the TAA allows a SARS official to inspect a business premise without prior notice. This 
may only be done where SARS has reason to believe that a trade is being carried on at the premises. 
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The purpose of the inspections is to identify the person carrying on the trade and to verify that he is 
registered for tax purposes and maintain proper records. 
This would typically be done when SARS conducts Inspection Surveys. These surveys are face to 
face engagements with a taxpayer at the taxpayer’s premises. The purpose is to complete a 
prescribed questionnaire to determine the identity of the person occupying the premises, whether the 
person is registered for tax and whether the person is keeping records in the required format. 
The problem with these inspections is that the owner of a registered business might not always be 
available to supply SARS with the correct name of the company and reference numbers. Such 
inspections should be conducted only with the owner of the business and not with any of the 
employees’. The taxpayer should also have the opportunity to contact his tax representative or 
attorney to be present if he so wishes, although this would seem unnecessary due to the questions 
being straightforward and factual. 
2.5.1.3 Conclusion 
There are no additional powers or additional rights introduced by the new TAA. The purpose of 
random spontaneous inspections is intended to develop a compliant tax base which is important for 
the effective administration of a tax Act. The Legislature considers these inspections as ‘regulatory’, 
‘compliance’, or ‘administrative’ which is a minimal, justifiable intrusion on the right to privacy of a 
taxpayer.47 
 
This is an administrative procedure that is not likely to constitute an unlawful violation of a taxpayer’s 
right to privacy as it will pass the test of a justifiable intrusion on the right to privacy in order to enable 
the tax authority to perform its duties. SARS should however conduct inspections in a lawful, 
reasonable and fair manner.   
2.5.2 Production of relevant material in person 
Section 47 of the TAA allows SARS to request a taxpayer to be personally present for an interview.    
This information gathering procedure is not an interrogation conducted during a formal inquiry but an 
informal interview for purposes of clarifying tax issues that might render further verification or audit 
unnecessary. It is therefore also less intrusive method of information gathering than a formal audit on 
the tax affairs of a taxpayer. A taxpayer is entitled to have a legal advisor present although this 
information gathering process is specifically prohibited for purposes of criminal investigations. 
It is submitted that this information gathering process is less intrusive on the rights of a taxpayer than 
other powers contained in the TAA and is a justifiable infringement on taxpayers’ rights.  
2.5.3 Audit   
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The repealed provisions of the Income Tax Act 
 
74A. Furnishing of information documents or 
things by any person 
 
The Tax Administration Act 
40. Selection for inspection, verification or audit 
46. Request for relevant material 
48. Field audit or criminal investigation  
 
 
2.5.3.1 Purpose 
Section 40 of the TAA empowers SARS to select a taxpayer for an audit on the basis of any 
consideration relevant for the proper administration of a tax Act. This is considered a reasonable and 
necessary violation of a taxpayers’ right to privacy in order to enable SARS to perform its duties.   
The purpose of an audit is to ensure compliance with the various tax acts administered by SARS.  
The SARS (excluding the Customs division) conducts audits mainly on compliance with the Income 
Tax Act and the Value-Added Tax Act. Audits are also conducted on Employees Tax as provided in 
Schedule 4 to the Income Tax Act. Employees Tax audits will often result in an adjustment of Skills 
Development Levies and Unemployment Insurance Contributions. This is mainly due to the fact that 
PAYE audits will adjust remuneration and these taxes are directly linked to remuneration. 
Section 40 of the TAA now prescribes the basis upon which a person may be selected for an 
inspection or audit being either a random selection or a risk assessment basis. It should be noted that 
paragraph (k) was inserted into section 68 of the TAA which prohibits the disclosure of information 
relating to audit selection procedures used by SARS, in case such disclosure could jeopardise the 
effectiveness thereof.  
 
2.5.3.2 Selection basis for inspection, verification or audit 
The TAA did not enhance the powers of SARS to conduct audits on taxpayers. There are specific 
provisions to ensure that these powers are exercised reasonable and fair. Section 40 of the TAA now 
prescribes the basis upon which a person may be selected for an inspection or audit being either a 
random selection or a risk assessment basis. 
SARS conducts audits on various taxpayers in order to detect non-compliance. The full enforcement 
of the law against non-compliant taxpayers will, in theory, motivate the public to be voluntarily 
compliant with tax legislation. SARS has moved away from being a gatekeeper to focussing on risk 
based audits. This involves the move to identifying and auditing high risk taxpayers. The Client Risk 
Unit of SARS is responsible for identifying and selecting these taxpayers for referral to audit. 
Taxpayers with lesser risks are identified automatically by a computer programme. SARS hopes to 
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implement the risk based approach effectively by increasing access to third party data and by 
increasing third party validation of declarations. The pre-populating of data from third parties (e.g. 
IRP5 data from the employer is pre-populated on the income tax return of an individual) reduced the 
opportunity for false or inaccurate declarations.48 (SARS Strategic Plan 2013/14 - 2017/18, 2013) 
2.5.3.3 Random Selection of taxpayers for audit  
It is necessary to also randomly select taxpayers for audits due to the fact that that is impossible for 
revenue authorities to audit all taxpayers.  A simple random selection process implies that all 
taxpayers’ have an equal probability of being selected for an audit regardless of the risk of non-
compliance. Random auditing is a mechanism to measure compliance levels and to validate risk 
assessment models. It is also used to identify new tax evasion schemes and to act as a general 
deterrent against non-compliance.  
In SARS, the random selection process is done by a risk engine which is programmed in the Service 
Manager software which is the SARS mirror version of the E-filing software used by taxpayers. This 
risk selection criterion is not known to the general public and is changed from time to time. This is not 
a scientific selection of a random sample of taxpayers but rather a targeted selection from taxpayers 
that meet defined criteria. The criteria can be that certain deductions are claimed, for example 
donations. A tax refund or decrease in a tax liability from current to previous tax year will also be a 
typical risk selection criteria programmed into the risk engine.  
The recently introduced ITR14SD form, where taxpayers have to reconcile Income Tax, VAT and 
PAYE information, is also a source for selecting random audits. 
SARS has the power to randomly select a taxpayer for an audit which is a justifiable limitation of his 
rights.  
2.5.3.4 Risk assessment basis of selecting taxpayers for audit 
The risk assessment basis cases are selected by the Client Risk Unit in SARS and referred to the 
Audit division who then allocate resources in accordance with the risk profile. These cases have a 
specific risk of non-compliance that needs to be investigated. A notification of the audit must be 
issued to the taxpayer and this notice must indicate the initial basis and scope of the audit.49 This 
selection criterion can be anyone of the following: 
-A specific industry. 
-Information received from financial institutions e.g. banks information on interest income. 
-Information received from third parties e.g. real estate agents information on rental income 
-Information received from government departments e.g. tender payments. 
-Spin-offs from other cases e.g. creditor of a taxpayer did declare income 
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-A suspicious activity report filed on the SARS website e.g. disgruntled employee who is 
aware of tax evasion 
-Information shared by other revenue authorities in terms of an international tax agreement. 
-The information on SARS database will also be screened for risks e.g. Deeds Office records 
and ENatis Vehicle Licence records 
SARS has the power to select a taxpayer for an audit on a risk assessment basis which is a justifiable 
limitation of his rights.  
 
2.5.3.5 Taxpayer rights: Decision to select a taxpayer for an audit  
 
Section 40 of the TAA empowers SARS to select a taxpayer for an audit on the basis of any 
consideration relevant for the proper administration of a tax Act. This is considered a reasonable and 
necessary violation of a taxpayers’ right to privacy in order to enable SARS to perform its duties.   
 
During a random selection of a company for an audit by the Australian Tax Office, a company 
challenged the authorities for being selected for an audit. The Australian Federal High Court held that 
the revenue authority does not have sufficient resources to audit all taxpayers and that, inevitably, 
there will be a random aspect to those who are selected for closer examination. On the issue whether 
there should be a suspicion of wrongdoing before a taxpayer is selected for audit, the Court held: 
  
“It is the function of the Commissioner to ascertain the taxpayer’s taxable income. To ascertain this he 
may need to make wide-ranging enquiries, and to make them long before any issue of fact arises 
between him and a taxpayer.”50 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court of Appeal has also confirmed the legality of the principle and held: 
“A spot check or a system of random monitoring may be the only way in which the integrity of the tax 
system can be maintained.”51 
During a recent case the Canadian courts52 held that the revenue authority acted improperly by using 
audit powers for selecting a taxpayer for an audit with an ulterior or secondary purpose.  
 
“The Federal Court did find that a valid audit purpose existed, but it found it to be a 
secondary or subservient purpose to the primary purpose of chilling the respondent’s 
business concerning the 10-8 plans. Based on evidence before it, the Federal Court 
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found that the Minister’s “primary goal” was to chill this business – a purpose that was 
not “sufficiently tied to her valid audit purpose” 
 
This decision shows that the decision to audit a taxpayer must be valid and not for alternative 
reasons.  
 
These cases are indicative of SARS’ power to conduct audits but also of the fact that the fiscal 
statutes and Constitution do not award unlimited powers to SARS.   
 
2.5.3.6 Keeping a taxpayer informed of the audit 
Section 42 of the TAA prescribes the procedure to keep a taxpayer informed during an audit. There 
were no similar rights afforded to the taxpayer in the old administrative provisions. This provision of 
the TAA enhances the rights of taxpayers’ and is more in accord with the right to just administrative 
action as enshrined in the Constitution.  
A taxpayer has the right to be informed on the progress of the audit at intervals of 90 days. This notice 
has to specify the period under review, the scope of the audit, the stage of completion and the 
relevant material still outstanding from the taxpayer.53 
The taxpayer also has the right to be informed of the outcome of an audit. SARS will issue this notice 
in the form of an ‘Audit Findings Letter’ which will list the potential adjustments and invite the 
taxpayers’ comments. SARS is not allowed to issue any revised assessments without giving the 
taxpayer the opportunity to reply.  
The right to be informed on the progress of the audit protects the taxpayer against audits protracted 
for long periods without receiving any feedback. Before the introduction of this Act it could happen 
that a taxpayer has not received any feedback for longer than a year and might assume that the audit 
has been finalised.  The revised assessment will then be his first notice of adjustments to his taxable 
income that SARS might deem necessary. The only option would then be to follow the dispute 
procedures where the taxpayer now has the opportunity to correct the facts after receiving the letter of 
audit findings and before a revised assessment is issued.  
However there is no sanction against SARS or remedies available to the taxpayer in cases where 
SARS fails to report on the progress of the audit as obligated in terms of section 42. A taxpayer could 
approach the civil courts but the high costs involved in such legal proceedings will most probably 
outweigh the remedy ordered by the courts. A taxpayer could approach the recently appointed tax 
ombudsman for assistance in unfair administrative treatment by SARS. 
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The letter of audit findings will also indicate any intention to impose Understatement Penalties and 
invite the taxpayer’s comments on why penalties should not be imposed. The burden of proof that any 
of the behaviours are present to impose Understatement Penalties rests upon SARS.54 In practice the 
audit findings and response from the taxpayer will be presented to an Understatement Penalty 
Committee to decide if any of the behaviours are present. The taxpayers are seldom invited to attend 
these meetings.55 A taxpayer may exercise his rights in terms of PAJA to attend this meeting. It is a 
taxpayer’s right to reply to the letter stating that it is the intention of SARS to impose penalties that he 
wishes to attend this meeting in person. He should advance reasons why his personal presence is 
mandated by the procedural fairness section 3(1) of PAJA.  
The minutes of the meeting can be requested by the taxpayer if he meets the requirements of section 
11 of Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA).56 The information supplied by the Commissioner 
is normally confined to the reasons for the decision taken. The discussion and arguments by the 
Committee before arriving at the decision are not included in the minutes of the meeting and will not 
be made available. 
The letter of audit findings cannot be disputed by the taxpayer but will invite his comments. This is the 
last opportunity to prove that the intention of the Commissioner to tax an amount is incorrect. He can 
state his facts in a reply before a revised assessment is issued.  The Commissioner will review his 
arguments and supporting documentation before deciding to concede or proceed with revised 
assessments as per his original intention.  
In cases of complex audit findings the taxpayer is normally invited to a meeting so that SARS can 
explain the content of the audit findings.  
2.5.3.7 Conclusion 
The introduction of section 42 did enhance the taxpayer’s rights. There was no similar provision in the 
Income Tax Act.  It has to be noted that this was the procedure adopted by SARS before the 
introduction of the TAA in response to the introduction of the PAJA and the Constitutional right to just 
administrative action. However there remain no remedies available to the Taxpayer in cases where 
SARS fails to report on the progress of the audit other than referring the matter to the Office of the 
Tax Ombudsman. 
The most important notice to which a taxpayer is entitled under this section is the Letter of Audit 
Findings. This is the last opportunity to furnish additional explanations or information in order to 
convince the Commissioner that a revised assessment should not be issued.  
It is also the only opportunity to furnish reasons why none of the behaviours are present in order to 
avoid the Commissioner’s imposition of Understatement Penalties. The standard letter issued by 
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SARS states that “Understatement Penalties shall be imposed” and in a later paragraph it invites 
comments as to why Understatement Penalties should not be imposed. This invitation to furnish 
comments enhanced the rights of taxpayers’.    
2.5.4 Criminal Investigation 
2.5.4.1 The legislation previously and now 
The repealed provisions of the Income Tax Act 
No specific provisions for Criminal investigation 
other than the general information gathering 
provisions in section 74A above.  
The Tax Administration Act 
43. Referral for criminal investigation 
44. Conduct of criminal investigation 
 
 
2.5.4.2 Purpose 
A decision by SARS to commence with a criminal investigation confers the additional rights of being a 
suspect on the taxpayer. These rights are protected in terms of section 35 of the Constitution. 
SARS might detect a serious tax offence during an audit. Section 1 of the TAA defines a serious tax 
offence as “a tax offence for which a person may be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a period 
exceeding two years without the option of a fine or to a fine exceeding the equivalent amount of a fine 
under the Adjustment of Fines Act, 1991 (Act no. 101 of 1991)." 
When a taxpayer is being audited and it appears that a serious tax offence has been committed, the 
case must be referred to a Senior SARS Official for a decision to conduct a criminal investigation.57 
The information obtained by audit before referral for criminal proceedings may be used in an 
investigation but not any information after referral for investigation.58 The information obtained during 
a criminal investigation may be used in both civil and criminal proceedings.59 
 
After a criminal offence relating to evasion of tax has been identified, a senior SARS official may lay a 
complaint with the South African Police Services or the National Prosecuting Authority.60  
2.5.4.3 Taxpayer rights 
A criminal investigation must proceed with due adherence to the rights of the taxpayer as a suspect.61 
To be regarded as a “suspect” requires a “reasonable” apprehension that the person concerned “may 
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be implicated in the offence under investigation”, to the extent that there is “an element of objectivity 
to the enquiry as to whether the person was in fact a suspect at the relevant time”.62 
 
The Constitution63 protects the following rights of a suspect: 
  “-To remain silent; 
  -To be informed promptly of the right to remain silent and the consequences of not 
remaining silent; and  
  - Not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in 
evidence against him or her during a criminal trial. 
  -Aligned to this, the Constitution protects the rights of a suspect to choose and be 
represented by a legal practitioner at his own expense, at least until arrest, and to be 
informed of this right promptly.” 
 
These Constitutional rights are further enhanced in the TAA: 
- An admission of an offence by a taxpayer made in the course of information gathering by 
SARS is not admissible in criminal proceedings, unless a court orders that it is.64 
- An inspection and an interview cannot be used when conducting a criminal investigation.65 
 
According to the SARS Short Guide to the Tax Administration Act (at pp37 – 38) the purpose of 
s72(2) is to: 
 “protect the right against self-incrimination of taxpayers compelled to provide information to 
SARS under Chapter 5 under threat of criminal sanction. Interventions by SARS under its 
information gathering powers for purposes of, for example an audit or investigation, are 
specific to identified taxpayers – rather than the general body of taxpayers – and are 
closer to cases where the Constitutional Court had struck down legislation that provided 
for the use of evidence obtained under compulsion in criminal proceedings. Section 72(2) 
preserves some residual power for the Court to depart from the default position and direct 
that, in a specific case, admissions gathered using SARS's information gathering powers 
may be used. In the context of verification, inspection or audit under Chapter 5, a taxpayer 
is not a suspect. However, if it appears during such verification, inspection or audit that a 
serious tax offence has been committed and the matter is referred for criminal 
investigation under the Act, the taxpayer can then be regarded as a suspect and SARS is 
then obliged to conduct the investigation with due recognition of the taxpayer's 
constitutional rights as a suspect in a criminal investigation. Only once SARS has laid a 
criminal charge, will the taxpayer become an arrested, detained and accused person 
invoking the full protection afforded by the fair trial rights under the Constitution.” 
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The taxpayer can furnish information requested by SARS under Chapter 5 without the fear that it will 
be used in criminal proceedings and once criminal investigation commences he can rely on his 
Constitutional rights as a suspect in a criminal investigation.  
 
Section 43(1) of the TAA does stipulate that a senior SARS official has to decide whether to pursue a 
criminal investigation but is silent on whether the taxpayer should be informed of this decision. A 
taxpayer not aware of this decision may incriminate himself while the informed taxpayer could assert 
his Constitutional right to remain silent. PAJA provides that a taxpayer may request written reasons 
for administrative decisions that could materially and adversely affect a taxpayer rights. A taxpayer 
who is not informed will not be able to exercise this right and will not be able to approach the courts to 
review this decision. 
 
It is submitted that a taxpayer should be informed when SARS decides whether his case should be 
referred for criminal investigation.  
2.6 Search and Seizure 
2.6.1 Background 
SARS has the power to gather information by conducting search and seizure operations firstly with a 
warrant and secondly without a warrant.  A decision by SARS to search the premises of a taxpayer 
and to remove documents or things is an infringement of his right to privacy and right to property.   
The Constitutional Court held in the Bernstein66 case that: 
“In South Africa, the right not to be subjected to seizure of private possessions forms part of 
every person’s right of personal privacy. The right against seizure must therefore be interpreted 
in the light of the general right to personal privacy.” 
The search and seizure powers awarded to the Commissioner in the TAA may not be used to collect 
evidence to be used in a possible criminal prosecution. Search and seizure warrants for criminal 
cases must be obtained under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 or the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. This was confirmed in the recent case of Gaertner, PLM and 
Two Others v Minister of Finance & CSARS & 9 others67 where the judge remarked at 75: 
“The impermissibility of using administrative search powers for the predominant purpose of 
collecting evidence for a criminal prosecution is well established in the Canadian cases (see 
Jarvis v R [2002] 3 SCR). In Jarvis, which concerned powers of inspection and entry under 
income tax legislation, the court seems to have based its conclusion, as do I, on proper 
interpretation of the stated purposes for which the powers could be exercised. In Jarvis the 
powers could be exercised ‘for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of 
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the Act’. This was held not to include the prosecution and investigation of the offences 
created by the Act (see paras 77-81).” 
2.6.2 Search and seizure with a warrant 
The repealed provisions of the Income Tax Act 
74D. Search and seizure 
 
The Tax Administration Act 
S 59. Application for warrant 
S 60. Issuance of warrant 
S61. Carrying out search 
 
2.6.2.1 Purpose 
SARS may apply for a warrant in order to gather information necessary for the effective enforcement 
of legislation.  This procedure is normally only necessary in cases where taxpayers’ refuse to co-
operate or where there is proof of non-compliance. It would be unreasonable to investigate taxpayers 
who submit their returns on time and keep proper records while the taxpayers who are not submitting 
any returns or making any documentation available will escape the scrutiny of SARS. It is therefore 
not the average law abiding taxpayer who will be confronted with this intrusive method of information 
gathering.   
The repealed search and seizure provisions were contained in section 74D of the Income Tax Act. 
This section did require a warrant, unlike its predecessor s74(3), where the Commissioner himself 
could authorise a search and seizure operation without prior notification and without independent 
review.  Croome (2008:86) commented that section 74D replaced s74(3) in 1996 probably after the 
Katz Commission found that the authorisation of warrants by the Commissioner was invalid under the 
Constitution, together with the judgment in the Park Ross case.68 
The application for the warrant to enter a taxpayer’s premises and search for material and seize any 
relevant documentation must be made by a senior SARS official.69 SARS must apply ex parte to a 
judge of the High Court. In cases where the estimated tax involved is below R500,000 (the maximum 
for the Tax Board) the application for the warrant may be to a magistrate.70 
The law in South Africa acknowledges that authorities should not be permitted unrestricted access to 
search and seizure proceedings. It is important to note that SARS must have exhausted all other 
avenues available for obtaining the required information before applying for a warrant in order to 
invade the privacy of a taxpayer by entering his premises for purposes of search and seizure. There 
must be a balance struck between the interest of the taxpayer and that of SARS.71 
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This was noted in a decision by Langa DP:72 
“On the other hand, state officials are not entitled without good cause to invade the premises of 
persons for the purposes of searching and seizing property; there would be little content left to 
the right to privacy. A balance must therefore be struck between the interests of the individual 
and that of the State, a task that lies at the heart of the enquiry into the limitation of rights. On 
the proper interpretation of the sections concerned, the Investigating Directorate is required to 
place before a judicial officer an adequate and objective basis to justify the infringement of the 
important right to privacy […]. These provisions thus strike a balance between the need for 
search and seizure powers and the right to privacy of individuals […]. It follows, in my view, that 
the limitation of the privacy right in these circumstances is reasonable and justifiable.” 
 
The warrant must be produced during the search and if not, a person can refuse the SARS official 
entry to the premises.73   
2.6.2.2 Taxpayer rights during search and seizure operations with a warrant 
The TAA allows new additional protection to the taxpayers subjected to search and seizure actions: 
“(a) A provision making explicit the duty on SARS to conduct a search with strict regard to 
decency and order. 
(b) A requirement that SARS must make an inventory of seized material in the form, manner 
and time that is reasonable under the circumstances. 
(c) If the removal of original documents or computers may prejudice the continuance of a 
taxpayer’s business, SARS has a discretion to make and remove copies if appropriate. 
(d) A provision that a taxpayer may request SARS to pay or, if SARS declines, for a Court to 
order payment of the costs of physical damage caused during the conduct of a search and 
seizure.”74 
 
SARS may seize any relevant material. This could include cash, bullion, jewellery or even devices 
with storage capabilities e.g. cell phones, iPads, memory sticks, and portable hard drives. The 
storage devices will normally be taken to a forensic laboratory where officials will make mirror images 
and thereafter the device can be returned. This is not that easy in the case of cash seized. TheTAA 
does not have any provisions that prescribe when goods should be returned. If SARS refuses a 
request in terms of section 66 of the TAA to return seized material the taxpayer could approach the 
High Court.  Some countries, like India, have time limits on when assets should be released. There is 
also a punitive measure in the form of interest payable on excess money seized after deducting the 
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amount of any tax liability. No such provision exists in the TAA. The only claim for damages allowed in 
terms of section 66 is for damage caused during the search and seizure operations.  
Section 25 of the Constitution confers a right to property on all taxpayers’. The seizure of relevant 
material and not returning such material in a reasonable time could be an unlawful infringement on 
the right to property.    
 
2.6.3 Search and seizure without a warrant 
The repealed provisions of the Income Tax Act 
None 
The Tax Administration Act 
S 63. Search without warrant 
2.6.3.1 Purpose 
This is a new provision extending the powers of SARS and has been one of the most controversial 
provisions in the TAA. No search and seizure without a warrant was allowed in terms of the repealed 
section 74D of the Income Tax Act. What makes this provision controversial is that a previous section 
74(3), before its amendment by section 14 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act in 1996, allowed 
search and seizure without a warrant. This section 74(3) was amended after it was found to be invalid 
under the Constitution by the Katz Commission.75 
2.6.3.2 Taxpayer rights during search and seizure operations without a warrant 
The Constitutional Court has held in the two cases of Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of 
South Africa and Others 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) and Magajane v Chairperson, North West Gambling 
Board and Others 2006 (5) SA 250 (CC) that search and seizure powers without a warrant is 
unconstitutional. 
SARS is of the opinion that these cases are authority that the warrantless search provision of the TAA 
is constitutional permissible because it does contain the necessary “safeguards”. (SARS Briefing Note 
to Standing Committee of Finance, 2012)  
The fundamental rights of the Constitution are not guaranteed as it may be limited in terms of the 
limitation clause contained in section 36 of the Constitution. It is necessary to analyse paragraphs (a) 
to (e) of section 36(1) in order to determine whether any limitation of the privacy right is reasonable 
and justifiable in a democratic society.  
(a) The first factor: The nature of the infringed right. The right to privacy is the right that will be 
infringed during search and seizure actions. This has been held in Magajane76 and earlier 
cases to be an important right that belongs among the ‘indispensable freedoms’. The 
strictness of the limitation of this right will be different depending on the identity of the person 
                                                          
75
 Interim Report to the Commissioner of Enquiry into certain aspects of the tax structure of South Africa, the 
Katz Commission. 
76
 Magajane v Chairperson, North West Gambling Board and Others 2006 (5) SA 250 (CC) 
29 
 
bearing that right. The court has held that the privacy rights of a legal entity “can never be as 
intense as those of human beings”. The infringement of the privacy right will therefore be 
more reasonable in the case of a business premises than in case of a domestic dwelling. 
(b) The second factor: The importance of the purpose of the limitation. The purpose of the 
Revenue authorities when limiting a persons’ right to privacy must be a lawful purpose falling 
within their powers. The purpose of the limitation is to ensure that taxpayers are compliant 
with the Act and pay the correct amount of taxes due. This purpose is in public interest and 
essential for any government who has to fund public services to the general public by 
collecting taxes. 
(c) The third factor: The nature and extent of the limitation. This factor deals with how the 
limitation influences the protected conduct and interests (its substantive effect) and to what 
degree there has been non-compliance with the duties of persons bound by the right. The 
procedure that was followed during the search to limit the right to privacy is also a decisive. 77 
In Gaertner, PLM and Two Others v Minister of Finance & CSARS & 9 others78 the court held 
that at least three considerations are relevant: “(i) A commercial property occupier has a lower 
expectation of privacy; and persons who conduct certain kinds of business know that their 
businesses are regulated and may be monitored. Searches of such business premise will 
involve a lesser intrusion on the right to privacy. (ii) Inspections aimed at uncovering evidence 
for use in criminal prosecutions will involve a greater intrusion; as will inspections aimed at 
enforcement (often with quasi-penal consequences) rather than compliance, though not all 
cases will be amenable to such a clear distinction. (iii) The broader and less circumscribed 
the inspection power, the greater the limitation. An overboard power fails to inform the 
inspected person of the limits of the inspection and leaves the inspector with insufficient 
guidelines as to how to conduct the search in a lawful manner and with due respect for the 
inspected person’s privacy.”  
The difference between searching a person’s residence and business premises have been 
pointed out by Langa J in the Hyundai case where he remarked that “[P]rivacy is a right which 
becomes more intense the closer it moves to the intimate personal sphere of the life of human 
beings, and less intense as it moves away from that core”.79 
(d) The fourth factor: The relationship between the limitation of the privacy right and the purpose 
of the limitation. The purpose of the limitation is to ensure tax compliance in the interest of the 
public and this purpose must outweigh the limitation of the right to privacy.   
(e) The fifth factor: Is less restrictive means available to achieve the same purpose. The Revenue 
authorities should first explore other available avenues of obtaining the information 
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documentation or things before opting for the search and seizure powers that will infringe the 
right to privacy. SARS could call for the information or documentation under other provisions 
of the TAA. A starting point could be a simple telephone call or informal visit and a last resort 
could be a summons to appear in the court. 
2.6.3.3 International comparison 
The OECD published a survey comparing the information access and search powers of tax officials 
during 2013.80 The survey compared 34 OECD countries and 18 Non-OECD countries. South Africa, 
a non-OECD country with observer status, participated in this survey. It was found that tax 
administrations generally have wide powers to enter a taxpayer’s business premises and dwellings for 
purpose of obtaining information, documentation or things in order to verify tax compliance. These 
powers are limited in 23 countries where a search warrant is required to enter business premises. 
These powers are more restricted in case of entering the dwelling used for residential purposes with 
39 countries requiring a search warrant necessary to enter a taxpayers’ residential dwelling.   
2.6.3.4 Conclusion 
In the judgment in the most recent case81 of warrantless search and seizure operations it was held 
that warrantless routine searches are justifiable under the Customs Act in respect of licenced 
business premises but placed several restrictions on the search and seizure of a residential property. 
This case dealt with searches conducted in terms of the Customs Act which is a normal routine 
activity performed by Customs officials. In case of such routine searches there are not reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe that a particular offence has been committed. In this case it was also 
held that there is no justification for warrantless non-routine searches. It should be noted that the 
search and seizure operations in this case was done under the provisions of section 4 of the Customs 
and Excise Act, 1964 which allowed warrantless search and seizure operations. It should be noted 
further that, as a result of this judgment, this section was extensively amended by the Tax 
Administration Laws Amendment Bill of 2013 to regulate warrantless search and seizure operations, 
but that the section in the TAA has not been tested in the courts. 
Routine searches are hardly ever necessary in case of enforcing Income Tax legislation. Most 
searches for purposes of enforcing Income Tax legislation will be of a non-routine nature after a 
specific risk has been identified.  These searches are mainly done for collecting evidence for criminal 
proceedings and is therefore not done in terms of the Tax Administration Act but in terms of the 
Criminal Proceedings Act. The SARS will therefore only be able to use the search and seizure powers 
for enforcement purposes in non-routine cases where the taxpayer does not cooperate in supplying 
information and there are reasonable grounds to believe that it will deliver evidence of tax evasion. 
These searches will be non-routine and normally taxpayers will not have a reasonable expectation to 
become the subject of such search and seizure operations. In such cases it will be difficult to convince 
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a court that there are not less restrictive means available to achieve the same purpose. It has been 
held that there is no justification for non-routine warrantless searches of a registered taxpayer. 82 
It is submitted that routine or non-routine searches without a warrant, for purposes of enforcing 
Income Tax or VAT legislation will not be justifiable under our Constitution. A non-routine search with 
a warrant could be justifiable if there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a person 
committed a tax offence and the search will deliver evidence of the offence.  
It is therefore submitted that section 63 of the TAA may be unconstitutional for purposes of enforcing 
Income Tax and VAT legislation and that the limitation of the privacy right would not be reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society.  
2.7 Request of information from third parties 
2.7.1 The legislation previously and now 
The repealed provisions of the Income Tax Act 
Sections 69 & 70 & 74A 
The Tax Administration Act 
S26. Third party returns 
2.7.2 The purpose 
In the past financial institutions issued certificates (IT3(b)) to taxpayers reflecting the return on their 
investments in the form of interest and dividends. It was the responsibility of taxpayers to include this 
income on their tax returns. As part of the modernisation process of SARS, institutions are now 
required to submit this information in electronic form83 directly to SARS. This information will either be 
pre-populated on the returns of income or used to verify the accuracy of declarations. This will 
contribute to the risk assessment function to identify possible non-compliant taxpayers for an audit 
intervention. 
From the 2013 tax years the following institutions are required to submit returns on a bi-annual basis: 
(i) Banks; (ii) Co-operative banks; (iii) Postbank; (iv) Financial institutions; (v) Companies listed on the 
JSE and connected persons that issue bonds, debentures or similar financial instruments; (vi) State 
owned companies that issue bonds, debentures or similar financial instruments; (vii) Organs of the 
State that issue bonds or similar financial instruments; (viii) any person who purchases any livestock, 
produce, timber, ore, mineral or precious stones from a primary producer other than on a retail basis; 
(ix) Medical schemes; (x) Estate agents who pay to, or receive on behalf of, a third party, any amount 
in respect of an investment, interest or the rental of property and (xi) Attorneys who pay or receive on 
behalf of a third party any amount in respect of an investment, interest or the rental of property.84  
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It should be noted that, compared to the previous year, SARS included more third parties in the 
request for information. The notice of 2013 included the last four institutions for the first time. It is 
expected that the list will grow in the coming years. There is already speculation about adding the 
Credit Bureau to the list of third parties required to submit a return.   
SARS issued a notice85 requesting banks for the first time to furnish SARS with information on the 
total debit and credit entries on bank accounts for the tax year ending on 28 February 2013. The 
reason for this request is not clear as it is not reliable information for verifying the declared income 
mainly because deposits from loans received; inter-bank account transfers etc. will not constitute 
income.  Also the fact that income is reported on the accrual basis and not cash basis will make this 
information incomparable with the income reported. It is however important to realise that SARS has 
requested this information from banks and it is not possible for a taxpayer to prevent the bank from 
furnishing this information. It is also not necessary for the Commissioner to inform a taxpayer that the 
information is being requested and therefore the taxpayer will not have the opportunity to defend his 
right to privacy.  
2.7.3 Is a request for information from third parties an infringement of the right to 
privacy? 
The modernisation of SARS to become a more efficient revenue authority made it necessary for 
electronic information reporting by third parties. The matching of the information received from third 
parties is an extremely effective tool for the screening of tax returns in order to detect any under-
declaration and to encourage the correct reporting of taxable income. 
This is an international accepted method of information gathering. An overview of the information 
collection powers used by revenue authorities in OECD and selected non-OECD countries indicate 
that almost all revenue authorities (except Malaysia and Poland) have powers to obtain relevant 
information. Virtually all of these revenue authorities have the power to extend the request for 
information to third parties (except Malaysia, Poland and the Slovak Republic).86 
The request of information from third parties is an infringement of a taxpayer’s Constitutional right to 
privacy, but again in terms of the general limitation clause, it is reasonable and acceptable in an open 
and democratic society. There is no other less intrusive procedure that the tax authority could use to 
obtain the required information. The limitation does not constitute an unlawful violation of taxpayers’ 
rights. The international tendency agrees with this conclusion.   
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CHAPTER 3 IS THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY PROTECTED WITH THE 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION? 
3.1 Introduction 
Information gathering is crucial for tax authorities for verifying the correctness of declarations by 
taxpayers. This information is mainly gathered locally by revenue authorities to verify the correctness 
of income from local sources. In recent years we have seen an increase in cross border transactions 
making it necessary for tax authorities to gather information from other jurisdictions in order to verify 
the correctness of income generated from international trade. This resulted in agreements whereby 
tax authorities agree to share information of mutual interest. The purpose of information exchange 
goes further than tax compliance. It is also an effort to fight financial and other crimes, including the 
targeting of terrorist financing. 
Section 3(3) of the TAA allows the exchange of information with other revenue authorities: 
“(3) If SARS has, in accordance with an international tax agreement, received a request 
for— 
(a) information, SARS may obtain the information requested for transmission to the 
competent authority of the other country as if it were relevant material required for purposes 
of a tax Act and must treat the information obtained as if it were taxpayer information;  
(b) the conservancy or the collection of an amount alleged to be due by a person under the 
tax laws of the requesting country, SARS may deal with the request under the provisions of 
section 185; or  
(c) the service of a document which emanates from the requesting country, SARS may 
effect service of the document as if it were a notice, document or other communication 
required under a tax Act to be issued, given, sent or served by SARS.” 
 
Section 108(1) of the Income Tax Act also allows the authorities to enter into agreements that allow 
the exchange of information: 
    
“The National Executive may enter into an agreement with the government of any other 
country, whereby arrangements are made with such government with a view to the 
prevention, mitigation or discontinuance of the levying, under the laws of the Republic 
and of such other country, of tax in respect of the same income, profits or gains, or tax 
imposed in respect of the same donation, or to the rendering of reciprocal assistance in 
the administration of and the collection of taxes under the said laws of the Republic and 
of such other country.”  
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Section 108(5) of The Income Tax Act allows the breach of the secrecy provisions, contained in 
section 4 of the Income Tax Act, when exchanging information about South African taxpayers in terms 
of an agreement:  
“The duty imposed by any law to preserve secrecy with regard to such tax shall not 
prevent the disclosure to any authorized officer of the country contemplated in 
subsection (1), of the facts, knowledge of which is necessary to enable it to be 
determined whether immunity, exemption or relief ought to be given or which it is 
necessary to disclose in order to render or receive assistance in accordance with the 
arrangements notified in terms of subsection (2).”  
 
Section 108(5) of The Income Tax Act allows the breach of the secrecy provisions, contained in 
section 4 of the Income Tax Act, when exchanging information about South African taxpayers in terms 
of an agreement. 
 
De Koker and Brinckler (2010:36.14) commented that the history of section 108 should be considered 
when interpreting this section. This section was part of the original Income Tax Act when it was 
enacted in 1962. This was prior to the Interim Constitution of 1994 when it was necessary for 
Parliament to incorporate a treaty into law through an Act. After the Constitution all treaties became 
law under section 231(4) when published in the Government gazette. The Constitution is the supreme 
law and it is no longer necessary for the subordinate legislation contained in section 108 to bring 
treaties into South African law. It is submitted by the writers that after the Constitution section 108(5) 
“seems to address the administrative capacity of the tax administration to enable the administration to 
give effect to obligations arising under a tax treaty”. Without section 108(5) the SARS would not be 
authorised to exchange information about taxpayers as it would be precluded from doing so in terms 
of the secrecy provisions of section 4. The writers conclude that section 108 is a leftover from a 
previous era and will not infringe on the rights of taxpayers. The Constitution remains superior and 
protect the rights of taxpayers.92 
In terms of section 231(4) of the Constitution, a DTA and TIEA becomes part of South African tax law 
once it is approved by Parliament in terms of Sec. 231(2) of the Constitution, unless it is inconsistent 
with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
 
Tax information exchange (TIE) is deemed necessary for proper and effective application of domestic 
tax laws and double-taxation treaties. Tax information is private and confidential. Therefore, TIE 
involves the transfer of sensitive and personal information between jurisdictions. This implies that 
there should be established safeguards ensuring reasonable private interests. 
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Section 72 of POPI stipulates that information will not be transferred to another country if, for 
example, proper safeguards for the protection of the information have not been adopted in that 
country or the data subject has not consented to the transfer. 
South Africa’s tax information exchange network consists of 76 Double Tax Agreements and 9 Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements. 
The OECD has published detailed best practice recommendations regarding confidentiality of 
exchanged tax information.93 The following paragraphs discuss these recommendations and the 
procedures adopted in South Africa. 
3.2 Confidentiality standards 
3.2.1 Background 
The right to privacy is an international basic human right and also implies the right to confidentiality. 
In respect to ECHR article 8, the ECHR case of Lundvall v. Sweden (11.12.1985) provides a general 
illustration of this point, specifically regarding tax information. The court stated that publication of tax 
information was an interference with the right to private life if the disclosure could harm the private life 
of an individual. 
 
Various human rights conventions protect the right to privacy: 
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 3 
 -International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in article 17 
 -American Convention on Human Rights in article 11 
 -European Convention on Human rights (ECHR) in article 8 
 - United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in article 12 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Constitution of South Africa protects the right to privacy in section 14. 
Chapter 6 of the TAA contains confidentiality provisions in sections 67 to 74. 
 
3.2.2 The OECD model on TIE 
The OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters has the same 
confidentiality standards as contained in article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital. 
Article 8 of the TIEA provides that: 
“Any information received by a Contracting Party under this Agreement shall be treated as 
confidential and may be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and 
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administrative bodies) in the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party concerned with the 
assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination 
of appeals in relation to, the taxes covered by this Agreement. Such persons or authorities shall 
use such information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court 
proceedings or in judicial decisions. The information may not be disclosed to any other person 
or entity or authority or any other jurisdiction without the express written consent of the 
competent authority of the requested Party.” 
An important difference is the last sentence of article 8 which is not in the Model Tax Convention. This 
allows for broader sharing of information with persons other than tax authorities provided that written 
consent is obtained. With the written consent the information may be disclosed to any other person or 
entity or authority or any other jurisdiction. 
Another difference is that the Model Convention contains an additional proviso that information should 
be treated “as secret in the same manner as information obtained under domestic law.” The absence 
of this proviso in article 8 does not have any bearing as domestic laws protecting confidentiality 
equally applies in the international context. 
The absence of this proviso on secrecy could however prevent the transfer of information between 
countries if the agreements based on the Model Tax Convention are not compliant with section 72 of 
the POPI Act. This section provides that information will not be transferred to another country unless 
there is law governing the recipient “which provide[s] an adequate level of protection that— 
(i) effectively upholds principles for reasonable processing of the information that are substantially 
similar to the conditions for the lawful processing of personal information relating to a data subject 
who is a natural person and, where applicable, a juristic person; and 
(ii) includes provisions, that are substantially similar to this section, relating to the further transfer of 
personal information from the recipient to third parties who are in a foreign country in accordance with 
those applied in South Africa”. Currently this is unlikely to be a problem as all South African 
information exchange agreements contain secrecy provisions ensuring information received will be 
regarded as confidential.94 
3.2.3 Tax confidentiality provisions in the domestic legislation 
A requirement is that contracting states must have confidentiality provisions in their domestic laws. In 
South Africa the domestic law that protects tax information is contained in Chapter 6 of the TAA. All 
SARS employees and contractors are required to sign an oath of secrecy95 and may not divulge any 
information to a person who is not a SARS official.96  
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The secrecy provisions of the TAA may be breached in terms of section 108(5) of the Income Tax Act 
that allows the disclosure of confidential information, to a person who is not a SARS official, when 
information is exchanged with other tax authorities in terms of a double tax agreement.  
South Africa meets the requirements of having domestic confidentiality provisions.97 
3.2.4 Penalties for breach of confidentiality 
The OECD guide states that domestic legislation must set out penalties for improper disclosure of 
confidential information and that these should be strong enough to act as a deterrent for disobeying 
the law.98 In terms of section 236 of the TAA any person who breaches the secrecy provision is guilty 
of an offence and, upon conviction, is subject to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
two years. 
  
3.3 Are domestic laws ensuring confidentiality of tax information 
consistent with treaty standards? 
 
A requirement of the OECD model TIEA is that the domestic law protecting the confidentiality of 
taxpayer information99 should not be overridden by some other domestic law granting public access to 
information. In South Africa the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) gives effect 
to the constitutional right of access to information. A specific exemption from access to information 
exists in section 35 of this Act which gives mandatory protection of SARS’s records.  
Any person may request access to their records held by SARS in terms of PAIA and such requests 
must be in the prescribed format. All requests must be addressed to one of two Deputy Information 
Officers. The Information Officer is the Commissioner of SARS. There are three categories of 
information held by SARS of which taxpayer information is one category. This category includes tax 
returns, bills of entry, declarations, assessments, financial statements, financial or other information 
about taxpayers collected from various sources and evaluative records. SARS will provide a taxpayer 
(or the person authorised to represent him) with copies of his own records which includes the tax 
return, assessment, statement of account and similar records. SARS will deny a request for records in 
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terms of PAIA if it contains information that SARS holds or has obtained for the purposes of enforcing 
revenue legislation.100  
The PAIA specifies the following categories of information to which access will be refused: 
-mandatory protection of privacy of a third party who is a natural person;  
-mandatory protection of certain records of SARS;  
-mandatory protection of commercial information of a third party;  
-mandatory protection of certain confidential information and protection of certain other 
confidential information of a third party;  
-mandatory protection of safety of individuals and protection of property;  
-mandatory protection of police dockets in bail proceedings and protection of law 
enforcement and legal proceedings;  
-mandatory protection of records privileged from production in legal proceedings;  
-defence, security and international relations of the Republic;  
-economic interests and financial welfare of the Republic and commercial activities of 
public bodies;  
-mandatory protection of research information of a third party and protection of research 
information of a public body;  
-operations of public bodies; and  
-manifestly frivolous or vexatious requests or substantial and unreasonable diversion of 
resources.  
 
3.4 Imposition of sanctions on public servants 
The TAA contains a comprehensive definition of confidential information102 and the disclosure of 
SARS confidential information is regulated.103 A person found guilty of unauthorised disclosure is 
subject to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.104 This provision is applicable 
to current and former employees and contractors who are responsible for the administration of the tax 
Act. 
3.5 Is the information handled by competent and otherwise suitable 
persons? 
All SARS employees’ are required to sign an oath of secrecy which is annually renewed. SARS 
employees who deal with sensitive information have to undertake a security clearance. An official 
found guilty of breaching the confidentiality provisions can be fined or imprisoned.   
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3.6 Storage of confidential information 
All information gathered by SARS is stored on a secure server and there have been no reports of any 
unlawful access to any information.  
3.7 Transmission of confidential information. 
“When a request for information is received from another jurisdiction, all documents are 
scanned and stored on a secure server, and the paper files are destroyed. Only the personnel 
directly involved in exchange of information cases (part of the Division of Enforcement Risk 
Planning) has access to this server. Currently, five persons have such access. When a request 
is forwarded to a local revenue office, the confidentiality of the information is emphasised to 
ensure maximum awareness of this issue. 
Currently, SARS does not use an encrypted e-mail system. Where e-mail exchanges occur with 
other jurisdictions, confidential information is not included in the text of the e-mail. SARS 
does however use WinZip encryption (if supported by a jurisdiction) should a document be e-
mailed to a jurisdiction. The password is e-mailed in a separate e-mail to the jurisdiction. 
Otherwise, all information is posted” 105  
There have been no reports of a breach in confidentiality by any other tax authority.106 
Section 72 of POPI stipulates that information will not be transferred to another country if, for 
example, proper safeguards for the protection of the information have not been adopted in that 
country or the data subject has not consented to the transfer. This will not prevent the exchange of 
confidential information in terms of current agreements as all South African information exchange 
agreements contains provisions ensuring information received will be regarded as confidential.107 It is 
submitted that the current legislation and procedures are satisfactory to protect the right of taxpayers’.  
3.8 US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) 
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) allows for private information of taxpayers to be 
exchanged with the IRS. 
The introduction of FATCA in the United States during March 2010 is an important development in its 
efforts to improve tax compliance involving foreign financial assets and foreign accounts. The goal of 
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this Act is to identify potential US tax evaders who may be using offshore accounts to hide their 
assets. The United States has requested all governments to enter into an intergovernmental 
agreement that will require all financial institutions located in its jurisdiction to identify accounts held 
by US citizens. This agreement will impose a duty on the banks in South Africa to transfer the 
information on these accounts via SARS to the IRS. These agreements are additional information 
exchange agreements from the existing DTA’s or TIEA.108 
The South African government, through SARS, National Treasury and Financial Intelligence centre 
has begun negotiations regarding inter-governmental agreement with the United States government 
on information exchange specifically relating to FATCA. South Africa seeks reciprocal multi-lateral 
agreements on tax matters.109 
This agreement allows for personal bank information to be exchanged via the tax authorities. It does 
not take domestic laws into account that protect a person’s right to privacy. SARS has free access to 
information held by banks and can exchange this information in terms of an international agreement. 
The common law duty of banker client confidentiality will be overridden by this intergovernmental 
agreement which will become law in terms of section 231 of the Constitution. The SARS has to 
perform the duties imposed upon him in terms of the law. It is submitted that the automatic exchange 
of a taxpayers’ confidential bank information is a justifiable limitation of the right to privacy in an open 
and democratic society.  
3.9 Purchase of information 
The SARS previously had a system where persons were rewarded for information supplied on parties 
guilty of tax evasion. No references could be found where Revenue authorities admit to the practise of 
paying informants for information obtained from within other jurisdictions. 
This was found to be a practise of the German tax authorities. In a recent court case, the Swiss 
authorities found Mr Lutz Otte guilty of information theft after selling information to the German tax 
authorities. The right to privacy of the Swiss Constitution includes a right to ‘private family life’ such as 
financial income and assets and as a result all bank information is protected by Swiss laws.  The 
disclosure of bank information is a criminal offence under the Swiss Criminal Code.110 
Mr Lutz Otte is a German-born independent computer technician who was employed by the Julius 
Baer private bank in Switzerland. Mr Otte gathered the names, addresses and account numbers of 
German clients with assets in excess of 100,000 Euros, Swiss Francs, British Pounds or Dollars. He 
compiled a list and passed this on to a retired German tax inspector and from the evidence it was 
heard that it was agreed that in return he would receive compensation of 1.1 million Euros from the 
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German tax authorities. Mr Otte also allegedly sold information on Dutch account holders to the Dutch 
tax authorities.111  
There are several other reported incidents where the German tax authorities purchased stolen data in 
order to identify tax evaders. All 16 states in Germany have admitted to being party in buying stolen 
data. Mr Borjans, the finance minister in one of these states, has indicated that this practice will 
prevail “so long there is data containing valuable tips to be bought”.112   
This is also the practise of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the United States that offers a 15%-
30% reward of the revenue recovered from information received from whistle blowers. During 2010 
the IRS paid 97 awards to the total value of $18,746,327 and collected $464,695,459 as a result of 
this information. A condition of this reward program is that more than $2 million must be collected by 
the IRS as result of the information received.113 
An award claimed by Bradley Birkenfield, under this program, made the headlines in 2009. The IRS 
purchased information containing the names and account information of US citizens holding 
undeclared accounts at the UBS bank in Switzerland. The information was stolen from the bank by 
Bradley Birkenfield who was an employee at the bank. It is alleged that he received a $104 million 
award from the IRS.   
The payment of an award for information to identify tax evaders might be acceptable to society but 
there are questions about the legality of the purchase of stolen data. Furthermore this is a serious 
infringement of a taxpayer’s constitutional right to privacy. This is also a breach of the obligation of 
confidentiality between a bank and its clients. There is proof that these practises do exist in other 
jurisdictions, but there is no South African law whereby tax whistle-blowers are paid an award and no 
cases have been recorded where SARS has purchased stolen data to identify tax evaders.  
3.10 The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for 
Tax Purposes 
This forum was established under the auspices of the OECD and G20 economies in order to develop 
an international standard of transparency and exchange of information among governments to fight 
tax evasion and increase tax collection. There are currently 120 members in the Global Forum.114 The 
forum provides recommendations and supports reform aimed at ending bank secrecy and expanding 
the network of information exchange agreements. 
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According to the Global Forum there are ten essential elements against which jurisdictions’ legal and 
regulatory framework and actual implementation of the standards are assessed: 
 “A AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION 
A.1. Jurisdictions should ensure that ownership and identity information for all relevant  
entities and arrangements are available to their competent authorities. 
A.2. Jurisdictions should ensure that reliable accounting records are kept for all relevant 
entities and arrangements. 
A.3. Banking information should be available for all account-holders. 
B ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
B.1. Competent authorities should have the power to obtain and provide information that is 
the subject of a request under an EOI agreement from any person within their territorial 
jurisdiction who is in possession or control of such information. 
B.2. The rights and safeguards that apply to persons in the requested jurisdiction should be 
compatible with effective exchange of information. 
C EXCHANGING INFORMATION 
C.1. EOI mechanisms should provide for effective exchange of information. 
C.2. The jurisdictions’ network of information exchange mechanisms should cover all 
relevant partners. 
C.3. The jurisdictions’ mechanisms for exchange of information should have adequate 
provisions to ensure the confidentiality of information received. 
C.4. The exchange of information mechanisms should respect the rights and safeguards of 
taxpayers and third parties. 
C.5. The jurisdiction should provide information under its network of agreements in a timely 
manner.” 
 
A peer review report published by the Global Forum on 27 October 2012 found that South Africa has 
nine of the ten elements in place. The timely exchange of information element (C.5) was not fully 
assessed.115 
3.11 Global Forum’s Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreement (MAAA) 
Another form of information exchange that could affect the rights of taxpayers’ is the Mutual 
Administrative Assistance Agreement (MAAA). This agreement allows for information to be 
automatically exchanged and not just on request from other authorities. 
This agreement should be ratified during 2013 or 2014. Once ratified, it will increase SARS’s 
information exchange ability with authorities that currently do not have bilateral agreements with 
South Africa. This will also strengthen the enforcement capabilities of SARS together with debt 
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collection efforts.118 It is also possible to use these agreements for collecting outstanding taxes in 
countries where it is not allowed by the current tax treaties. SARS are of the opinion that these 
agreements will enhance their risk detection and risk profiling capabilities which in the end will result 
in increased revenue.119  
This agreement will be used to exchange private information of taxpayers which constitute a limitation 
of the right to privacy. The collection of taxes on behalf of other authorities could be a limitation of the 
right to property which has not been investigated for the purposes of this dissertation.   
The  MAAA will become law in terms of section 231 of the Constitution. The SARS has to perform the 
duties imposed upon him in terms of the law. It is submitted that the automatic exchange of a 
taxpayers’ information is a justifiable limitation of the right to privacy in an open and democratic 
society.  
3.12 Conclusion on the right to privacy and the exchange of information 
The TAA in Section 3(3) allows the exchange of information in terms of international agreements. The 
Constitution in section 231 brings international agreements into South African law. Section 108 of the 
Income Tax Act then authorises the SARS to perform the obligations under a treaty.  
 
Tax information exchange is necessary for proper and effective application of domestic tax laws. It is 
the duty of SARS to enforce the domestic tax laws and perform the duties imposed upon him in terms 
of international agreements. 
 
There has to be safeguards for confidentiality before information is transferred. The information 
gathered by SARS may only be shared with tax authorities to be used for tax purposes.  
 
I conclude that the exchange of information is a reasonable and necessary limitation of the right to 
privacy.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE TAXPAYER’S RIGHT TO BE INFORMED ABOUT AND 
APPEAL AGAINST THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
 
4.1 DOMESTIC LAW 
4.1.1 THE TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT 
The TAA does contain provisions that prescribe that SARS must keep a taxpayer informed, but this is 
limited to the instance of audit.120 It is practice of SARS to issue a notification when a person is 
selected for an audit and a letter of audit findings after the finalisation of an audit. During the audit the 
taxpayer is also informed on the stage of completion and if adjustments are made the taxpayer will 
also receive a letter explaining what adjustments have been made. These procedures are standard 
for all taxpayers including non- resident individuals and companies that have been selected for an 
audit.  
Section 3(3) of the TAA authorises SARS to collect information requested for transmission to another 
tax authority. There is no provision in our domestic legislation to ensure that a person is informed 
when an individual or company has been selected for an audit by another tax authority and that 
authority requests information from SARS. SARS can request information without informing the 
taxpayer that it is for reason of exchange purposes. There is also no provision available for a taxpayer 
to appeal against the exchange his of tax information.121 
4.1.2 THE CONSTITUTION 
As already mentioned, the Constitution is the supreme law in South Africa.  
The various agreements that allow the exchange of information with other states are part of South 
African law in terms of section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act, read together with section 231(4) of the 
Constitution. The exchange of information must therefore not infringe any rights conferred to any 
person in the Bill of Rights, provided that it is justifiable in terms of the general limitation clause. 
The right to be informed is not specifically listed in the Bill of rights. Before a right can be infringed it 
must first be established if a person was the bearer of that right. Section 14 of the Constitution 
provides that everyone has the right to privacy. This section reads that the right to privacy “includes” 
certain named rights. The use of the word “includes” implies that the list is not exhaustive.122 The right 
to privacy therefore includes a right to protection against the unlawful collection, use and distribution 
of personal information. 
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The Constitution does not contain an exhaustive code of all rights and there are other rights beyond 
those expressly mentioned in the Constitution that are recognised or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation. These other rights are not denied by the Bill of Rights to the extent that 
they are consistent with the Bill.123 
4.1.3 PAJA 
PAJA was enacted to give effect to the right to lawful, reasonable and fair administration as contained 
in section 33 of the Constitution. PAJA provides that a taxpayer may request written reasons for 
administrative decisions that could materially and adversely affect a taxpayer rights or legitimate 
expectations. Legitimate expectation is a broader concept than the rights conferred upon a person in 
terms of the Bill of Rights. 
An legitimate expectation was described in Administrator, Transvaal and Others v Traub and 
Others124 as: 
“the legitimate expectation doctrine is sometimes expressed in terms of some substantive 
benefit or advantage or privilege which the person concerned could reasonably expect to 
acquire or retain and which it would be unfair to deny such person without prior consultation 
or a prior hearing; and at other times in terms of a legitimate expectation to be accorded a 
hearing before some decision adverse to the interests of the person concerned is taken.” 
The Commissioner’s decision to exchange of information with other tax authorities is an administrative 
action. Croome (2008:164)125 contends that “the Commissioner must inform the taxpayer of the 
planned action before he implements it, so the taxpayer may make representations to the 
Commissioner before he finalises the decision. The Commissioner must supply the taxpayer with 
sufficient information about the ‘proposed administrative action’, to enable him or her to understand 
the consequences thereof.” This is in line with the requirement of section 3(2)(b)(ii) of PAJA. 
This could result in an infringement of a right as a taxpayer who is not informed will not be able to 
exercise his right to fair administration and will not be able to approach the courts to review this 
decision.  
4.1.4 THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION ACT (POPI) 
4.1.4.1 The purpose of POPI 
This Act126 was gazetted on 26 November 2013 and gives expression to the right of privacy as 
contained in section 14 of the Constitution. The POPI recognises that everyone has the right to 
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privacy that “includes a right to protection against the unlawful collection, retention, dissemination and 
use of personal information”.127  
The Explanatory Memorandum of the Bill128 states that “The Bill aims to give effect to the right to 
privacy, by introducing measures to ensure that the personal information of an individual (data 
subject) is safeguarded when it is processed by responsible parties. The Bill also aims to balance the 
right to privacy against other rights, particularly the right of access to information, and to generally 
protect important interests, including the free flow of information within and across the borders of the 
Republic."  
It is aimed at protecting citizens’ right to privacy including the flow of information within and across the 
borders of the Republic. It applies to the processing of private information by a responsible party. The 
definition of a responsible party includes a public body such as SARS. Section 72 stipulates that 
information will not be transferred to another country if, for example, proper safeguards for the 
protection of the information have not been adopted in that country or the data subject has not 
consented to the transfer. 
4.1.4.2 Limitations on the application of POPI 
The Act gives effect to an individual’s right to privacy but is subject to justifiable limitations. 
Section 6 of the POPI contains certain exclusions as far as its application and for example will not 
apply in circumstances where the processing of personal information is carried out by a public body 
and “the purpose of which is the prevention, detection, including assistance in the identification of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities and the combating of money laundering activities, investigation or proof 
of offences, the prosecution of offenders or the execution of sentences or security measures, to the 
extent that adequate safeguards have been established in legislation for the protection of such 
personal information” 
4.1.4.3 Conditions of POPI for the lawful processing of personal information 
Chapter 3 of the POPI contains conditions for the lawful processing of personal information. 
The eight core information protection principles are discussed below with specific reference to SARS 
as the responsible party: 
(i) Accountability (Section 7) 
The responsible party (SARS is a public body which is included in the definition of a 
responsible party) must ensure that all principles of the Act are adhered too. 
(ii) Processing limitation (Sections 8,9,10 & 11) 
The information must be processed lawfully and in a legal manner that does not 
infringe the privacy of a person.  
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There are several laws authorising SARS to process information. This could be an 
infringement on the right to privacy, but as discussed earlier, such infringement is 
justifiable.  
 
Personal information may only be processed if a person gives consent and if it is 
justifiable for certain specific reasons. SARS does not have a procedure to obtain the 
consent of a person before exchanging his personal information. This provision could 
have far reaching implications on international information exchange. Automatic 
exchange of bulk information will be almost impossible if the consent of thousands of 
individuals have to be obtained. Request for information on specific identified 
individuals, who poses a risk of tax evasion, will normally be opposed by the 
individuals involved for fear of being brought to justice.  
 
I submit that either section 11(1)(c) or (e) of POPI may override the requirement for 
SARS to obtain prior approval for the collection of information to be exchanged. This 
is because processing could be necessary in order for SARS to fulfil the lawful duty 
imposed upon him in terms of the South African Revenue Services Act, 1997 (Act No. 
34 of 1997) (SARS Act) and it could be necessary for the proper performance of a 
public duty by a public body.  
 
(iii) Purpose specification (Sections 12, 13, 14) 
SARS does have a lawful purpose to collect information on individuals and SARS will 
meet the requirements of this principle. 
 
(iv) Further processing to be compatible with purpose of collection.(Section 16) 
The further processing of information is specifically allowed if done to enforce 
legislation concerning the collection of revenue as defined in the SARS Act. 
 
(v) Information quality (Section 16) 
SARS places a high premium on the accuracy of information and does take 
reasonable practicable steps to ensure the accuracy of information. 
 
(vi) Openness (Section 17) 
Non-compliance with this principle is specifically allowed if necessary to enforce 
legislation concerning the collection of revenue as defined in the SARS Act. 
 
(vii) Security safeguards (Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21) 
SARS is bound by secrecy provisions as contained in the TAA and does have the 
necessary policies and procedures in place to treat all information as confidential. 
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(viii) Data subject participation (Sections 22, 23 and 24) 
A person has the right to request a public body the description of personal information 
held by the responsible party and information about the identity of third parties, who 
have or have had access to the information. The public body may refuse to supply the 
information on grounds of Chapter 4 of the PAIA. (Refer to chapter 3.3 for a 
description of these grounds.) 
 
A person has the right to correct personal information after receiving a description of 
personal information being held by a responsible party. A person may request the 
responsible party to correct or delete personal information that is inaccurate, 
irrelevant, excessive, out of date, incomplete, misleading or obtained unlawfully. 
The POPI Act will not prohibit SARS to process personal information as it is justifiable 
and necessary for complying with an obligation imposed by law.129 The POPI Act 
explicitly creates the right to be informed on the collection and exchange of personal 
information. There is currently no procedure in place to notify a person that his 
personal information will be exchanged between revenue authorities.  
 
This could be a violation of the “Processing limitation” that requires the consent of a 
data subject before his personal information is being processed. I submit that either 
section 11(1)(c) or (e) of POPI may override the requirement for SARS to obtain prior 
approval for the collection of information to be exchanged. This is because 
processing could be necessary in order for SARS to fulfil the lawful duty imposed 
upon him in terms of the South African Revenue Services Act, 1997 (Act No. 34 of 
1997) (SARS Act) and it could be necessary for the proper performance of a public 
duty by a public body.  
 
The remedy available where persons’ rights have been infringed is to lodge a complaint to the 
Information Protection regulator. This juristic person is subject only to the Constitution and to the law. 
The regulator will investigate complaints and issue a compliance notice if he finds that there has been 
a transgression of the Act. Failure to comply with the provisions of this Act could result in fines of up 
to R10 million or up to ten years imprisonment. 
The actual commencement date of this Act has not been announced and it remains to be seen how 
this legislation will affect current tax information exchange procedures. 
4.2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Section 39 of the Constitution provides that international law must be considered and foreign law may 
be considered when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
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4.2.1 THE OECD MODELS 
Effective exchange of information is an important tool that provides for a legal framework to enable 
countries to apply and enforce their domestic laws, and can take place, inter alia, in terms of an article 
in a Double Tax Agreement (DTA); or a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA).  
4.2.1.1 MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON DOUBLE TAX AGREEMENTS 
Article 26 of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital contains the provisions 
relating to exchange of information in terms of a DTA and most of the DTA’s signed by South Africa 
are based on this model.130 
The Contracting State is not bound to go beyond its own domestic laws and administrative practices 
to supply information requested by the other state.131  
Paragraph 14.1 of the Commentary132 on Article 26 states that there are certain countries where the 
taxpayer has a right to be informed prior to the supply of his information: 
“Some countries’ laws include procedures for notifying the person who provided the 
information and/or the taxpayer that is subject to the enquiry prior to the supply of 
information. Such notification procedures may be an important aspect of the rights provided 
under domestic law. They can help prevent mistakes (e.g. in cases of mistaken identity) and 
facilitate exchange (by allowing the taxpayers who are notified to co-operate voluntarily with 
the tax authorities in the requesting State).” 
South Africa does not have specific tax administration procedures in place to notify a subject that his 
information is about to be exchanged with another tax jurisdiction. However, there are countries 
where this right does exist. As discussed paragraph 5.1.4.3 above, the South African taxpayers also 
enjoy this right to be informed, although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.  
4.2.1.2 MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON DOUBLE TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS 
(TIEA) 
South Africa’s TIEAs are based on the OECD Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement.133 
Article 1 of the TIEA Commentary provides that rights and safeguards granted to persons are not 
overridden, but it obliges the requested Party to ensure that such rights and safeguards are not 
applied in a manner that unduly prevents effective exchange of information.134 
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Article 5 provides that information shall be provided to the extent allowable under the requested 
States domestic laws. 
Article 7 contains limitations to the obligation to collect and make available information in terms of the 
agreement. It limits the Contracting Party’s obligations to information 
 which the requesting party would be able to obtain under its own laws for the administration or 
enforcement of its own tax laws; 
 would not disclose any trade secrets; 
 would not reveal confidential communications between a client and attorney or solicitor; 
 would not be contrary to public policy; 
 does not discriminate against a national of the requested Party as compared with a national of 
the applicant Party in the same circumstances.  
 
The OECD prescribes a model template for a request for information in terms of a Tax Information 
Agreement by tax authorities.135 This document acknowledges that certain countries have domestic 
legislation in place that obligate the tax authorities to inform a subject that his information is being 
exchanged and that there might be exceptions to this notification requirement. This document allows 
a tax authority to request that the taxpayers involved should not be notified and if such a request is 
made the requesting state has to confirm that they will be able to refrain from notification in similar 
circumstances. The commentary to the agreement states that rights and safeguards such as prior 
notification should not be disregarded unless this procedure will cause a delay “such that it calls into 
question the usefulness of the information exchange agreement”. 136  
 
4.2.1.3 THE OECD SUMMARISED 
 
The DTA and TIEA both specifically addresses information held by banks, financial institutions or 
persons acting in a fiduciary capacity. The DTA states that domestic legislation that protects bank 
secrecy, information held in a fiduciary capacity, or treat ownership of information as a trade secret 
may not be used as a basis for declining to provide information. The same result is achieved by the 
TIEA, although in a somewhat different manner; by maintaining that the Contracting Parties shall 
ensure that its competent authorities have the authority to provide such information. 
The TIEA also contains a clear determination that information shall be provided to the extent 
allowable under the requested Party’s domestic laws, and that rights and safeguards granted to 
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persons are not disregarded. The DTA only go so far as to declare that a Contracting State is not 
bound to go beyond its own internal laws to make information available. 
4.3 APPEAL AGAINST THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
4.3.1 THE TAX OMBUDSMAN 
The function of the Tax Ombud is to resolve administrative disputes where SARS refuses to review a 
decision and where all internal dispute resolution mechanisms have been exhausted. The Tax Ombud 
must resolve disputes laid by taxpayers using informal, fair and cost effective measures. It is a 
remedy for taxpayers where SARS fails to respect taxpayer rights and an alternative to costly court 
proceedings. 
The exchange of information is an administrative decision and where taxpayers’ rights have been 
infringed, a complaint can be referred to the Tax Ombud. The Tax Ombud was only recently 
appointed and it remains to be seen whether this will be an effective alternative to court actions for 
issues relating to tax information exchange. 
4.3.2 THE CAYMAN ISLANDS CASE137 
This judgment dated 13 September 2013 is the first reported judgment to deal with tax information 
exchanged between tax authorities. The case dealt with a request from the Australian Tax Office 
(ATO) for information from the Cayman Islands Tax Information Authority (CITIA) in terms of a Tax 
Information Sharing Agreement.  
In terms of section 17(1) of the Tax Information Agreement signed between the two governments, a 
person who is the subject of a request for information shall be served with a notice advising the 
person of the request and the general nature of the information sought. The subject will then have 
fifteen days to make a written submission to the authorities as to whether the request is lawful. 
In this case the CITIA failed to serve such a notice on the Applicants. The court found that the 
Applicants were entitled to be informed and the failure to serve notices infringed the Applicants’ rights 
under the Bill of Rights. 
This international judgment could be relied upon in challenging the exchange of information by SARS 
when there could possibly be an infringement on the right to privacy, the right to be informed and the 
right to a fair trial. This judgment acknowledged that a tax authority has an obligation to comply with 
agreements to share information but that it must be done in such a way as not to infringe any rights of 
the taxpayer.   
4.3.3 CONCLUSION 
In today’s global economy taxpayers can generally operate freely across international borders, but tax 
authorities must respect the sovereignty and laws of the countries in which its tax residents operate. 
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Information should not be exchanged before SARS confirmed that the requesting country does have 
the same rights and safeguards in place to protect the rights of a subject. 
The Constitution and POPI grants a person the right to be informed. Currently South Africa does not 
have any safeguards and procedures in place to protect this right when exchanging information with 
other tax authorities. There may be specific circumstances where a limitation of this right could be 
justifiable but to disregard this right entirely could be an infringement of a taxpayer’s rights. 
SARS should follow other authorities’ example and notify a subject prior to exchanging information. It 
is submitted that this right should be included in all international agreements. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
Professor R.C. Williams stated that: “In short, there are many aspects of tax administration and 
taxpayers’ rights that are still unresolved and await authoritative determination by the courts.”138 
 
The Tax Administration Act, effective from 1 October 2012, aimed to balance the powers and duties of 
SARS with the rights and obligations of taxpayers.139 This Act has received wide criticism from tax 
professionals that it did not achieve what was intended and that there are sections that infringe upon 
the Constitutional rights of taxpayers’.140 
 
The TAA did not seek to recap all Constitutional rights word by word. This does not imply that a 
taxpayer is not entitled to certain rights as they can be claimed in terms of the Constitution and the 
Acts promulgated to give effect to these rights.  In terms of PAJA a person can request reasons for 
administrative action that could materially affect your rights and such a decision may be reviewed by 
the courts. In terms of PAIA a person can request information from SARS about his tax affairs. In 
terms of POPI the personal information is protected.  
 
The information gathering procedures are necessary in order for SARS to accomplish the duties 
imposed by the SARS Act and there is no other less intrusive method available in performing these 
duties. The inspection and audit powers are a justifiable infringement on a taxpayer’s right to privacy. 
The right to be informed on the progress of an audit, the letter of audit findings and the letter informing 
of any adjustments did enhance taxpayers’ rights. 
 
The search and seizure provisions are a justifiable if conducted in a reasonable and fair manner but 
could be a serious infringement in the absence of a warrant unless there are extraordinary 
circumstances. It is submitted that the search and seizure of a residential property without a warrant 
will never be a justifiable limitation.  
 
The request for information from third parties e.g. banks is an internationally accepted practice. This is 
not an additional power awarded to SARS and is a justifiable infringement on privacy. 
 
The Constitution acknowledges international exchange of tax information agreements as law. It is 
justifiable infringement if conducted with the necessary safeguards.   
 
A taxpayer’s has the right to be informed when his personal information is being exchanged in terms 
of an international exchange of information agreement. This right has been ignored by SARS and this 
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is not a justifiable limitation. SARS should adopt the same procedures of keeping a taxpayer informed 
as when audits are being conducted by the South African authorities. 
 
The government has the primary obligation to protect human rights and if human rights are infringed 
by tax laws then it is the responsibility of the government to review and change these laws. The 
Constitution is the supreme law and the powers awarded to SARS are subject to the Constitution. 
This was confirmed in the judgment handed down in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
C:SARS where the court held that “no matter how indispensable fiscal statutory provisions were for 
the economic well-being of the country, they were not immune to the discipline of the Constitution and 
had to conform with its normative standards.”141  
 
There will be undesirable abuses of powers from time to time but that does not make the TAA 
unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court remarked as follows on this point: 
“Any power vested in a functionary by the law (or indeed by the Constitution itself) is 
capable of being abused. That possibility has no bearing on the constitutionality of 
the law concerned. The exercise of the power is subject to constitutional control and 
should the power be abused the remedy lies there and not in invalidating the 
empowering statute.”142 
 
The most cost effective remedy available to the taxpayer will be the Tax Ombudsman. It remains to 
be seen how effective this newly established body will be in preventing any abuse of power by SARS.      
 
As stated by Judge Bernard Ngoepe who has been appointed as the first Tax Ombudsman: “The Tax 
Administration Act’s structure is not perfect and satisfactory in many respects, but hopefully with the 
passage of time, as our wisdom graduates, we’ll be able to panel beat the ship into its proper cause 
and condition so that the office can better deliver that which it has been mandated to deliver.”143 
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